Russia in the United Nations: from confrontation to cooperation by Owens, Donald R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1992-12
Russia in the United Nations: from confrontation to cooperation
Owens, Donald R.







Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
RUSSIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS:
FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION
by
Donald R. Owens
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., University of Washington, 1983
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of





ECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Unclassified
a. PURITY ClAS^IMCATIoN AUTHORITY
lh. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
J.—DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY OF" RLPokT
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimitedb. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
:
—PERFORMING ORGANISATION ReToRT NUMBLY T.—MONITORING ORGANISATION kLPokT S'UMbl-k(S)
NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School





7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School






PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER







L TITLE (Include Security Classification)














The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
T8~ SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse ifnecessary and identify by block number)
United Nations, Security Council, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacekeeping,




ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify bv block number)
The recent atmosphere of cooperation in the United Nations (UN) has resulted in many nations, including the Russian
Federation, proposing increases in the scope and nature of security missions that the UN should undertake. This thesis will
focus on those security arrangements in the UN from the Russian perspective. This thesis will first examine die historical
policy of the former Soviet Union and discuss tiiose aspects that relate to the emerging Rusian policy in the UN, namely, the
rationale behind a cooperative approach and die factors which might return Russia to those confrontational policies of its
predecessor's past. This will be followed by a discussion of Russia's assumption of Soviet responsibilites in the UN and the
emerging foreign policy debate within the Russian government. This thesis will tiien highlight the recent Russian security
initiatives in the UN which include proposals for strengthening peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive diplomacy
ventures. Finally, an overview of the motivations and impediments behind Russia's renewed emphasis on strengthening
security management within the UN will be presented. Cirrrent diplomatic activity within the Russian Federation and United
Nations clearly illustrates that Russia is seeking, through a cooperative approach, to expand its influence within the United
Nations. However, in the future political infighting within die Russian government will determine the extent of this
cooperative policy in the UN.
1 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
Xj UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITEd[J SAME AS RPT.
j
DTIC USERS
za. NAML1 oV RLsToNs'lBLL1 INdIVIdUaL
MIKHAIL TSYPKIN




b t'okM I47A. 84 MAr





83 APR edition may lie used until exhausted
All odier editions are obsolete
ABSTRACT
The recent atmosphere of cooperation in the United Nations (UN) has resulted in
many nations, including the Russian Federation, proposing increases in the scope and
nature of security missions that the UN should undertake. This thesis will focus on those
security arrangements in the UN from the Russian perspective.
This thesis will first examine the historical policy of the former Soviet Union and
discuss those aspects that relate to the emerging Russian policy in the UN, namely, the
rationale behind a cooperative approach and the factors which might return Russia to
those confrontational policies of its predecessor's past. This will be followed by a
discussion of Russia's assumption of Soviet responsibilities in the UN and the emerging
foreign policy debate within the Russian government. This thesis will then highlight the
recent Russian security initiatives in the UN which include proposals for strengthen
peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive diplomacy ventures. Finally, an overview
of the motivations and impediments behind Russia's renewed emphasis on strengthening
security management within the UN will be presented.
Current diplomatic activity within the Russian Federation and United Nations
clearly illustrates that Russia is seeking, through a cooperative approach, to expand its
influence within the United Nations. However, in the future, political infighting within
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL THESIS
The recent atmosphere of cooperation in the United Nations (UN) has
resulted in many nations, including the Russian Federation, proposing increases
in the scope and nature of security missions that the UN should undertake. This
thesis will focus on those security arrangements in the UN from the Russian
perspective. Specifically, this study will examine the historical policy of the
former Soviet Union and discuss those aspects that relate to the emerging Russian
policy in the UN, namely, the rationale behind a cooperative approach and the
factors which might return Russia to those confrontational policies of its
predecessor's past.
From its inception, the UN was hampered by the emerging cold war and the
associated confrontational attitudes of its members. In particular, the Soviet
Union's activity within the United Nations (prior to the mid-1980's) was
confrontational in both nature and in practice. A study of the Soviet voting
record within the Security Council, Soviet declaratory policy and Soviet
participation in UN mandated missions clearly demonstrates that the Soviet
government was set upon a course of confrontation within the UN.
This confrontational attitude of the Soviet Union was not without cause.
This policy, while in complete agreement with ideological nature of competition
between capitalism and communism, was founded on the realities of the cold
war. Specifically, Soviet confrontation in the UN provided another means of
vn
limiting the ability of the Western nations to undermine the power, position and
authority of the Soviet government in the international arena.
As the Soviets' internal problems grew and became increasingly
unmanageable (late 1980's) the Soviet government began to look upon the UN not
as a tool for blocking the West, but as a means of increasing Soviet "breathing
space" in the international arena so that they might better focus on domestic
problems. By the early-1990's, the Soviets began to use the UN as a mechanism
for assisting themselves in the maintenance of their security, albeit in a limited
sense.
By the beginning of 1992, the Russian Federation had secured the previously
held Soviet seat in the UN and more importantly in the Security Council. Since
that time the Russians have continued, much like their predecessors the Soviets,
to look toward the UN as a means of enhancing their security and power in the
international arena. The Soviet government did this through confrontation and
later through the use of cooperative ventures in hopes of favorable "quid pro quo"
treatment. The Russians, on the other hand have used the UN to legitimize their
newfound position in the "new world order." Additionally, the Russian
government has attempted to further its own security by seeking to expand the
peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive diplomacy functions of the UN, which
it must be noted, are controlled by the Security Council of which the Russians
belong and hence influence with the use or threatened use of their veto authority.
vin
By analyzing the Russian government's declaratory policy coupled with their
current activity within the UN, one is left to believe that Russia will indeed
continue to pursue a cooperative policy within the United Nations. Furthermore,
most evidence suggests that Russia may embark upon a strategy of cooperation
for many of the same reasons that the former Soviet Union altered its philosophy
regarding the UN. These reasons are predicated on the maintenance of Russian
influence, prestige, power and security in the international arena, combined with
their desire to maximize the benefits of a cooperative policy, namely "quid pro quo"
or reciprocal treatment, while minimizing the intrusion of the UN into those areas
"near abroad" Russian soil.
This is not to suggest that a Russian cooperative policy in the UN is a
foregone conclusion. There are many possible impediments to Russian-UN
cooperation, but without a doubt the largest and most serious involves the current
domestic political battle raging between liberal and conservative elements within
the Russian government.
While one cannot assume that the Russian government will continue along
its current liberal reforming path, it is also unlikely that the extreme Russian
conservative agenda regarding the UN will manifest itself in the near term.
Instead it is more likely that we will witness a measured Russian retreat from the
current administration's reliance upon international organizations as a primary
vehicle for international policy implementation. Instead it appears that Russia
will take a more centrist approach, which emphasizes Russian unilateral activity
IX
in domestic and "near abroad" ventures while simultaneously cooperating within
the UN on those remaining international security problems. It is important to
note that this movement toward a more independent policy will not be directly
based on the traditional influence of the confrontational period of Soviet activity
within the UN, but instead will be built upon the domestic realities of Russian
"power politics."
Certainly current Russian declaratory policy and activity within the UN
suggests a deep commitment to cooperation in security ventures with the other
"great powers." However, the reality of domestic instability within the Russian
Federation may force a more conservative approach to cooperation in
international organizations. Unquestionably, a continued policy of cooperation
in the UN will net the Russian Federation gains in international influence,
enhanced security and most importantly aid. However, the same problems that
turned the former Soviet Union toward the UN, namely; political, military and
economic instability, may eventually lead the Russian Federation away from the
UN.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO CONFRONTATION AND COOPERATION IN
THE UN
A. CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION: BACKGROUND
From its inception, the United Nations (UN) was hampered by the emerging
cold war and the associated confrontational attitudes of its members. The
optimistic attitude toward the formation of a new "United Nations Organization,"
in the United States, rapidly gave way to the realism that the UN could never be
relied upon as the guarantor of "international peace and security." 1 As an
example of this attitude, prior to the ratification of the UN Charter, chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Tom Connally, felt the UN
Charter was "the greatest document of its kind that has ever been formulated." 2
Two short years later, as the world was firmly entrenched in the confrontational
aspects of the cold war, Connally felt the UN was incapable of handling complex
international issues and if presented with such an issue it would become "a buck-
passing arrangement, just a dodging and trimming and flim-flamming around."3
'The UN's purpose as a guarantor of "international peace and security" is set
forth in Article 1 (1) of the UN Charter.
2Quoted in Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985), 9.
3This statement was made in regard to allowing the UN to handle problems
of communist insurgencies in Greece and Turkey. Quoted in; Joseph L Nogee
and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), 93.
The Soviet approach toward the UN as the guarantor of "international peace
and security" was quite different than that of the West. The Soviets saw the UN
as an organization of the "Western Powers" which was dominated by Western
ideology. The Soviets' decision to join the UN was an "act of accommodation, not
conviction."4 It is quite clear from statements made by the Soviet leadership that
the Soviet Union envisioned the UN as an arena in which it would block the West
from infringing upon Soviet sovereignty. This confrontational attitude was to be
the primary Soviet policy for the first 40 years of the UN's existence.
As the cold war continued, it became increasingly apparent to most nations
that the roots of conflict imbedded in the cold war could not (or should not) be
settled in the UN. Furthermore, to hold out for this eventuality would be utter
and complete folly. In the end, it appeared as if the UN would become
ineffectual and unable to assume its envisioned role as "maintainer of
international peace and security." George Kennan summed it up best when he
wrote,
Some of the most important elements in the East-West conflict long predated
the foundation of the United Nations; they were part of the world into
which it was born. It is not fair to the organization today to ask it to resolve
the predicaments of the past as well as the present... to look to such an
4This point is convincingly made by Alvin Z. Rubinstein in; The Soviets in
International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953-
1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964); and Rubinstein, Soviet
Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 3rd edition (Glenview,
IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), 310-333.
organization to resolve deep-seated conflicts of interest among those Great
Powers is to ignore its limitations.../
It was not until the late 1980's that the UN witnessed the decreasing
confrontational attitude of its member states. Soviet General-Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev's call for a "comprehensive system of international security" in 1987
was the first of many attempts by individual governments towards fostering a
sense of cooperation and establishing an increased role for the UN in the
"maintenance of international peace and security."6 It remains to be seen if the
Russian government will continue this Soviet policy of cooperation in the UN and
indeed, "reject the hypocrisy of the conception of confrontation, of division of the
world into ours and others on the basis of ideological criteria" and instead strive
to "overcome the legacy of global confrontation and to dismantle the
confrontational structures that remain from that time."7
5My emphasis; George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West (New York:
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1957), 27.
"This was first set forth in Mikhail Gorbachev, "Reality and Guarantees for a
Secure World," Pravda, 17 September 1987 (Reprinted in English, see; International
Affairs (Moscow) 11 (November 1987): 3-11.
7As stated by the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, see; "Russia Cannot be Put
Back in a Cell," VREME, 15 June 1992, 41-43 (FBIS-USR-92-086, 10 July 1992, 15).
B. CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION: THEORY AND
ASSUMPTIONS
My intention is to show that Soviet policy within the UN (until the mid-
1980's) was guided by the confrontational realities of the cold war. I will
highlight the motivations behind Soviet policy in the UN and discuss why these
motivations changed during the late 1980's leading to a more cooperative path in
the UN for Soviet behavior. These motivations are important to highlight not
solely because of their "interesting nature" but also because they provide us with
insight into the emerging Russian policy in the world and specifically in the UN.
As there were many variables behind the Soviet's new approach of cooperation
in the UN so there are parallel variables in Russia's search for a "mild-mannered"
foreign policy toward the West and the UN. 8
The Russians have continued, much like their predecessors the Soviets, to
look toward the UN as a means of enhancing their security while simultaneously
maintaining Russian influence, prestige and power in the international arena.
Consequently, while there exists serious differences between current Russian
policy motivations in the UN and past Soviet policy, namely the control of ethnic
"The "mild-mannered" foreign policy of Russia usually implies cooperation
with the West and a foundation in international law. As opposed to the "tough"
foreign policy that "arouses Russian patriots' sympathies" and is associated with
Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi. This tough policy is more Russo-
centric and tends to limit involvement with the West; see, Yevgenii Krasnikov,
"Diplomacy: Aleksandr Rutskoi has His Own Foreign Policy," Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
21 May 1992, 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-100, 22 May 1992, 18-19).
violence and the search for financial assistance abroad, there are also exists a
motivational continuity between the two policies, specifically with regard to the
maintenance of national power, prestige and influence in the international arena.
Finally, with regard to comparing past Soviet policies with current Russian
policies, there is also merit in determining the possibility of a Russian
government's return to historically confrontational policies in the UN.
Through this analysis of past and present Soviet and Russian policies in the
UN, I intend to show that there are many plausible reasons to assume that the
Russian government will continue along the "cooperative path" in the UN. I will
not only illustrate the linkage between past Soviet policies and present Russian
policies but I will also describe the linkage between the structures and individuals
which formulated and implemented Soviet foreign policy with those now doing
so in the Russian government. In the end, I will demonstrate that there is a place
in the emerging Russian foreign policy for a continuation of cooperation in the
UN.
This is not to suggest, however, that a cooperative policy is guaranteed.
Political instability remains the key factor in determining any future foreign policy
agenda in Russia. Just as there are many reasons to assume that Russian policy
in the UN will remain of a cooperative nature so there are many factors which
could lead to more confrontational practices in the UN. Therefore, I will also
discuss those factors which may impede a cooperative Russian policy in the UN.
The breadth of topics which the UN "remains seized of" forces me to limit
this study to only those issues concerned primarily with the "maintenance of
peace and security." However as one can imagine, the various "approaches to
peace and security" (i.e. collective security, disarmament, trusteeship, functional
theories, etc.) can, in and of themselves, be an overwhelming topic. 9 Therefore,
I will limit this study to primarily those approaches to peace and security in the
UN which mandate the use of force. The increasing nature of these type of UN
activities (i.e. peacekeeping missions, Gulf War involvement, economic/ military
embargoes and the use of force to protect humanitarian efforts) continues to
illustrate the vast importance and relevance this topic has for us today.
With the end of the cold war many nations are looking toward the UN to
fulfill its Charter and undertake "effective collective measures for the maintenance
of international peace and security." 10 This includes increasing the scope and
nature of UN activities and activating many of the moribund functions of the UN
and its Security Council. In most instances, the Russian government has broken
from its confrontational roots to become one of the leading advocates for
increasing the UN's role in international security affairs. I will discuss the various
Russian initiatives regarding cooperative security measures in the UN and the
4
For the classic description of the various "approaches to peace through
international organization," see; Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The
Problems and Progress of International Oreanization, 4th ed., (New York:
Random House, 1984), 215-408.
inAs set forth in Article 1 and Chapters V-VII of the UN Charter.
possible Russian motivations behind turning the UN into the "main security
organization in the world.""
What was the Soviet policy within the United Nations? Will Russia continue
along the course of cooperation, which marked the recent policy of the former
Soviet Union? What might be the major reasons that the Russian government
would continue this cooperative policy? What are the impediments to a
cooperative policy? These are the major questions on which this study will focus.
HAs was suggested by Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.,
Boris Pankin in "The Dangers of Nationalism: The Development of the
Sovereignty Principle in International Law/' as delivered by Pankin to the 46th
Session of the UN's General Assembly, New York, 24 September 1991 (Vital
Speeches of the Day LVIII, no. 1, 15 October 1991: 7).
II. THE ROOTS OF CONFRONTATION AND THE ORIGIN OF
COOPERATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the policy of the former Soviet Union within the United Nations
has progressed from a strategy of confrontation to one of cooperation. This
chapter will examine the historical policy of the former Soviet Union from the
confrontational roots of the early cold war years to the cooperative tone of
Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of "new thinking."
Soviet policy in the UN can be broken down into three basic time frames.
In the first period, "Western" nations (North America, Western Europe and the
Commonwealth) comprised the majority voting block. The second period saw the
emergence of the "non-aligned movement," and the final period was marked by
the advent of "new-thinking" within the Soviet Union. I will attempt to highlight
the major points of these periods. I will also discuss why the Soviet Union
embarked upon the strategy of cooperation in the UN.
Overall, the UN presented the Soviet Union with a very cost-effective means
of attaining certain goals. Examples would include; the enhancement of a world
communist/socialist movement, blocking Western domination in the world order,
establishment of a global consensus (mostly non-aligned and Third World
nations) against the "Western Powers," and recently, maintenance of their global
s
influence. 12 Similar to the Soviets, the Russian government may manipulate the
UN as a means to enhance their power and attain international objectives without
paying a heavy price (i.e. money, resources or labor). In the end, if one hopes to
gain insight into future Russian policy within the UN one must thoroughly
understand the history and motivations of past Soviet policy within the UN.
B. HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The Soviet notion of a "United Nations Organization" was highly influenced
by their limited experience with the League of Nations. The Soviets felt the
League of Nations was an organization which, "legalizes robbery and violence by
the strong against the weak states." 13 The Soviet government increasingly came
to believe that the League of Nations was an instrument of the Western nations,
which would be used to eventually destroy the Soviet Union. A resolution of the
Sixth Congress of the Communist International stated:
The League of Nations... is itself more and more becoming a direct
instrument for preparing and carrying out the war against the Soviet Union.
The alliances and pacts concluded under the protection of the League of
12In 1962, Alexander Dallin suggested a similar list of opportunities that the
UN presented to the Soviet Union, these opportunities included; settlement of
minor disputes, a forum for international contacts, a fact gathering/ intelligence
forum, a forum to win prestige and respectability and a propaganda arena. See;
Dallin, "The Soviet View of the United Nations," International Organizations 16,
no. 1 (Winter 1962) 25-26.
13Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), 15.
Nations are direct means for camouflaging preparation of war, especially
war against the Soviet Union. 14
In the twilight of the League's existence, as the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union consolidated its domestic power, it exhibited less hostility towards
the League of Nations. With the emerging power of the German nation, Stalin
started to view the League as a means of blocking the threat of Nazi aggression.
By 1933, he felt,
The League may act in some degree like a brake, retarding or preventing the
outbreak of hostilities. If that were so, if the League were to turn out an
obstacle, even a small one, that made war more difficult, while it furthered,
even to a small extent, the cause of peace, then we would not be against the
League. 15
It was primarily with this hope of maintaining "collective security" that the
Soviet Union joined the League of Nations. However, the Soviets still held to the
belief that the League was a hostile organization, therefore, they must use it to
16
enhance their security while "preserving their own personality."
Soviet membership in the League had a short life, on December 14, 1939 the




16See Maxim Litvinov's comments on Soviet participation in the UN, The
Soviet Union at the United Nations, 18-19.
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aggression into Finland. This limited Soviet limited experience with the League
reinforced their notion of Western aggression toward communism, and the need
to maintain Soviet sovereignty and freedom of action in any international
organization. It was with this historical bias that the Soviets approached the
concept of a "United Nations Organization." The only useful purpose of the UN
(outside of a forum for propaganda) was to ensure their own security against
armed aggression and block interference in the internal affairs of the emerging
"communist bloc" by the "imperialist nations." The Soviets did not want to see
the UN become, much like the League had, an instrument of the West. To
prevent this occurrence, they felt that instruments in the UN Charter would have
to be adopted to safeguard their sovereignty.
The emergence of the Soviet Union, after World War Two, as a major world
power also served to shape its view with regard to the UN. The Soviets' post-
war vision of the UN seems to be dominated by three major themes. First, they
felt the UN could be used effectively as a forum for communist propaganda.
Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Foreign Minister, recently stated, "it will be only fair to
note that the Soviet approach to the UN as it was adopted at the time [post-
WWII] implied using the UN almost wholly and entirely as a propaganda
forum." 17
17Gennadi Gatilov and Andrei Kozyrev, "The UN Peace-Making System:
Problems and Prospects," International Affairs (Moscow) 12 (Dec 1990): 80.
11
From the beginning, the Soviets felt admission in the UN would provide
them with a major benefit. They would have an international forum for the
acceleration of communist/socialist rhetoric. Prior to the actual commencement
of UN activities Stalin told a group of Communist Party members, "We do not
need the UN.... What we need is a stage from which we can express any opinion
we want." 18
The second major Soviet view of the UN during the post-war period deals
with the prevention of armed aggression. Their views on this topic differed
slightly with those they held at the time of the League of Nations. Similar to their
feelings toward the League, they felt that decisions reached in the UN may help
prevent war. However, the way in which these decisions were to be reached
were drastically different than those in the League of Nations. First, any decision
resolving, "any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security," will be undertaken by the
Security Council, where the Soviets had the power of veto. 19 Second, and more
important, the Soviets felt that the UN would become a "front organization,"
rubber stamping proposals previously agreed upon by the major nations in secret
18Quoted in; Juliana G. Pilon, "Shattered Illusions: The UN and the USSR,"
Survey, 27 (Autumn/Winter 1983): 91.
19From Article 33 (1) of the UN Charter, see; Thomas M. Franck, Nation
Against Nation, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 161.
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negotiations. Stalin envisioned this procedure to be a continuation of the current
actions of the "Great Powers." 20
Finally, the last major post-war vision the Soviets had with regard to the UN
was one in which they could shape the organization as they saw fit. Again, this
view was highly influenced by their experience with the League of Nations.
Similarly to the League, the Soviets wanted the UN to be subordinate to
individual states' sovereignty. Furthermore, the Soviet Union did not want to be
bound to any decision that a majority of lesser (Western) states had agreed upon,
as was the case in the League of Nations. Stalin declared, at Yalta, that in this
new organization, "he would never agree to having any action of any of the Great
Powers submitted to the judgement of the small powers." 21 The Soviet leaders
also felt, "as an inter-state organization, the United Nations does not, and cannot,
stand above states; it is not and cannot be a self-sufficient body, independent of
states...."
22 For these reasons, the Soviet Union played a major role designing the
UN Charter specifically; the organization, composition and power of the UN
General Assembly, Secretariat and Security Council.
20For a further discussion of the "great powers" role in the UN, see; Philip E.
Mosely, "The Soviet Union and the United Nations," International Organization,
19 (Summer 1965); and Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and
Global 311.
21The Soviet Union at the United Nations, 22.
22M. Lvov, "United Nations: Results and Prospects," International Affairs
(Moscow) 9 (September 1965): 67.
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The General Assembly would provide the broad forum for the Soviet-style
propaganda. In the Assembly each country has an equal voice and vote. The
Soviets sought to diminish as much of the Assembly's power as possible, since
it was dominated by the "Western powers." For the Soviets, the Assembly was
best served as a powerless arena, used primarily for the dissemination of their
political views/ideology.
The Soviets felt, the Secretary-General and his "executive council" (the
Secretariat) should be a purely administrative body with the purpose of
implementing decisions of the Security Council and General Assembly. The
Soviets realized they did not have the political clout or coalition to completely
control the election process of the Secretary-General and therefore, sought to
minimize his power.
Finally, Soviet approval of the UN Charter could only be gained if their
power to control the Security Council was guaranteed by the means of an
effective veto. 23 The Soviets felt (as did the other four permanent members of
the Council) they must have the ability to approve or disapprove all amendments
to the Charter. The Soviet Union felt,
23'To be fair, this was also representative of the view of all the major powers.
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...no United Nations body, except the Security Council, can take any
decisions, binding on all member states of the Organization, on any question
except administrative matters and procedural questions."24
The Soviets believed international organizations were only transitional. With
the eventual disintegration of all capitalist states there would be no need for an
organization such as the UN. In the interim, the UN was to be used as an arena
of conflict to hasten the demise of the West through the "attractive" display of
communist ideology. It was also to be used as a body to ensure the Soviets'
continued survival, in the presence of the "imperialist threat."23 The General
Assembly served as an arena for Soviet propaganda, and their drive to limit the
powers of the Secretary-General, coupled with their veto power in the Security
Council, served to offset the Western dominance in the United Nations.
C WESTERN DOMINANCE
From the first days of the San Francisco Conference, the activities of the UN
were symbolized by the East-West conflict. This was to be the case for over forty
years. The question of Polish statehood, which had been put off since the fragile
compromise at Yalta, threatened to tear apart the UN in its first days. The two
rival regimes contending for Polish leadership (London Poles and Lublin Poles)
24
"United Nations: Results and Prospects," 67.
23For a more in depth discussion of this view see; "The Soviet View of the
United Nations."
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were being separately sponsored by the Western nations and the Soviet
government. Initially, the question of Polish statehood threatened to destroy the
San Francisco Conference; however, in a last minute compromise the UN
delegates agreed upon an empty resolution to "affirm the hope that the Polish
government would soon be formed...and send suitable delegates to San
Francisco."26 This compromise between the Soviets and the West marked the
beginning of the cold war competition in the UN, it was also to be illustrative of
the many "hollow" UN resolutions to follow.
The first meeting of the Security Council also reflected the future conflict
between the Soviets and the West. The agenda item of this first meeting was the
question of Soviet troop withdrawal from Iran. With the urging of the U.S., the
Iranians brought a complaint to the Security Council, which stated that the Soviet
Union had failed to pull its troops out of Iran as promised in September 1945.
The Soviets felt there was nothing to discuss in this Pro-Western forum, and that
any resolution would have to be negotiated bilaterally between Iran and the
Soviet Union. In the end, the Soviets and Iranians agreed upon a resolution
which amounted to a Soviet troop withdrawal in exchange for a promise from
Iran to allow a Pro-Soviet, semi-autonomous government in bordering
Azerbaijan.27 This conflict in the Security Council was to be the first of literally




hundreds of conflicts between the Soviets and the West in this UN body. These
conflicts reinforced the Soviets' view that they must maintain presence and
continue to participate in the UN if only to block Western imperialism. 28
In the post-WWII years, Soviet thinking in the UN was dominated by the
view of "two camps."29 On one hand you had the progressive socialist camp,
and on the other was the imperialist camp of the Western powers. Furthermore,
according to the Soviet Union, there was no room for neutrality or impartiality.
You were either with the Soviets or against them. The Communist Party's official
"organ," Kommunist stated;
The historical struggle taking place on the world stage in our days finds
expression within the walls of that Organization [the UN], where the world
is represented in all its manifold and of course contradictory complexity.
Here a polarization is taking place in the course of which the forces of
peace, freedom and social progress unite, while the advocates of aggression
and colonial slavery doom themselves to isolation. 30
This concept of two camps gave way to a similar concept of "three camps,"
in the mid-1950's. The additional camp was comprised of the "non-aligned"
countries. The Soviets felt that the struggle with imperialism would be decided
28The Soviet Union was to later relearn this lesson during their absence in the
Security Council when the issue of Korean aggression (1950) was addressed.
29For a discussion of the evolution of the "two-camp theory" see; Soviet
Foreign Policy Since World War II, 9-40.
30
"The Soviet View of the United Nations," 21.
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by winning over this new camp, and isolating the West. 31 However, in the early
post-war years of the UN, the Soviets often found their "camp" to be in the
minority. To ensure their own sovereignty and freedom of action, the Soviet
Union always made it known that they would not be bound to any decision in
the UN that threatened their survival as a state. Khrushchev frequently made this
point in his public statements in the UN, and at other official functions. He once
told the General Assembly, that the Soviet Union would ignore any UN decision
which it felt was incompatible with Soviet interests. He stated, if the Soviet
Union did not get its way it would, "uphold our interests outside this
international body, outside the United Nations, by relying on our own strength." 32
This all stemmed from the fact that the UN, at this time, was dominated by a
pro-Western voting majority, and was viewed by the Soviets as being openly
hostile toward non-Western beliefs. There is some truth to this Soviet view, as
former US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson said,
the United Nations—as an idea and as an institution—is an extension of
Western ideas; of Western belief in the worth and dignity of the individual;
of Western ideology. It is based on a Western parliamentary tradition. Its
roots are in the Western idea of representative government. In short, it is
thoroughly anti-totalitarian. 33
31For a more in depth discussion see; "The Soviet Union and the United
Nations," 666-677.
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The two major weapons the Soviets used to protect their interests in the UN,
during this period dominated by the West, were the veto power in the Security
Council and Article 2 (7) (the non-interference clause) of the UN Charter. The
non-interference clause was often the reason cited by the Soviet Union when they
used their veto. According to Article 2 (7); "nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."34 That clause was invoked by the
Soviet Union (as well as the U.S.) numerous times, regarding such topics as; the
"Universal Declaration on Human Rights," the Hungarian revolt in 1956, and
Czechoslovak uprising in 1968. Concerning the "Universal Declaration on Human
Rights," the Soviets felt that by protecting "political groups" with their inclusion
into this Declaration, the UN was infringing on the rights of all sovereign nations.
Specifically Soviet delegate, Andrei Vyshinsky, explained, "the rights of human
beings cannot be considered outside the prerogatives of governments, and the
very understanding of human rights is a governmental concept."33 Due to Soviet
insistence, all references to political rights were removed from the declaration
prior to its ratification.
Using similar arguments, the Soviets successfully blocked the UN from
undertaking any action during the "Hungarian Revolt" in 1956. The Soviet




government stated that, "Soviet troops. ..had been brought in at the request of the
Government of Hungary" and, therefore, this was a matter to be controlled by
regional members (i.e. Soviet Union and Hungary), furthermore, they felt it was,
"quite plain that this question in no way concerns the United Nations."36
By itself, the veto provided the Soviets with a powerful tool to ensure that
the interests of the Soviet Union and its satellites were not interfered with.
Lacking a majority of votes in the UN (specifically the Security Council) the
Soviets used the veto eighty times in the first decade, to block Western proposals
that were viewed as being obstructions to Soviet aims.37 Andrei Vyshinsky,
Soviet Ambassador to the UN (and former prosecutor during the show trials),
once declared that the veto was a means of self defense, he further explained,
The veto is a powerful tool. There are no such simpletons here as would let
it drop. Perhaps we use it more [than other nations], but that is because we
are in the minority and the veto balances power. 38
The Soviets' use of the veto was to take on much greater power than ever
envisioned by the Western nations. The original belief in the Security Council
36For a discussion of the Security Council's actions during the "Hungarian
Revolt" of 1956 see; Nation Against Nation, 62-64.
37Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 312.
38The Soviet Union at the United Nations, 51.
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was that "parties to the dispute," could not invoke the veto. 39 However, the
Soviets (as have many other nations, including the U.S.) have gotten around this
by either denying that they are involved in the dispute or denying the existence
of a dispute. In the Hungarian example, the Soviets felt the "problem" was an
internal activity and there was no international dispute present. Therefore, the
Soviets felt they were within the bounds of the Charter to veto proposed UN
intervention into Hungary. Another limitation of the veto set forth in the UN
Charter dealt with matters of procedure. The UN Charter states that "matters of
procedure" cannot be vetoed.40 However, if countries cannot come to an
agreement over whether a matter is procedural, they will vote on the issue, and
in this case the veto will apply. This effectively allowed the Soviet Union to
employ a "double veto" to block even procedural proposals. In the mid-1960's the
Security Council (without Soviet consent) effectively bypassed the double veto. 41
If you had to choose one case study that typified Western dominance in the
UN during this period, it would probably be the UN's role in the Korean Conflict.
In January of 1950, the Soviets boycotted the Security Council to protest the
seating of Nationalist Chinese representatives (instead of Communist
representative) in the General Assembly. As a result the Soviet representatives
39Refer to Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter.
40Refer to Article 27 of the UN Charter.
41For a discussion of the veto and "double veto" see; Nation against Nation
163-166; Swords Into Plowshares, 141-162, and Sydney D. Bailey, The Procedure
of the UN Security Council (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 200-223.
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were absent when the Security Council passed resolutions denouncing the North
Korean invasion of South Korea and authorizing UN intervention in Korea. The
Western nations were also able to pass the "Uniting for Peace Resolution in the
General Assembly, which, based on Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the UN Charter,
allowed for the General Assemblv (i.e. Western bloc) to take actions which
ensured "the maintenance of peace and security" when there was a deadlock of
the "Big Five" in the Security Council. 42 This resolution was obviously
undertaken to undermine the veto power of the Soviet Union. From the absence
of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, to the "Uniting for Peace Resolution,"
the Soviets were out-maneuvered and out-voted.
The Korean Conflict illustrates the weakness that the Soviet Union found
themselves confronted with in the UN. Although the Soviet led coalition of
countries was the "most cohesive voting bloc in the UN," it found itself limited
by its negligible size.43 During this period of "Western dominance" the Soviets
consistently found themselves in the minority in the UN's General Assembly and
hence felt forced to use the veto to protect their sovereignty within the Security
42Nation Against Nation, 39-41.
43t
*By 1957 of the 83 member nations in the UN only Albania, Bulgaria,
Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Ukraine and the USSR
were considered to be solidly entrenched in the Soviet voting bloc. For an
outstanding study of these early (pre-1960) voting blocs in the UN see; Thomas
Hovet Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1960).
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Council, for figures regarding veto's by the five permanent members in the
Security Council prior to 1960 see Table 1.
TABLE 1
VETO'S IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY COUNTRY: 1945-195944
(^s in parenthesis represent percentage of veto's)
# of Veto's USA UK France China USSR
1945-1949 2 43 (100%)
1950-1954 17 (100%)
1955-1959 2 2 1 27 (84%)
Source: The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 202-205.
This use of the veto in the Security Council by the Soviet government
clearly illustrates its confrontational policy in the UN. What is not so clear is that
the West, through it clear majority was able to similarly bloc Soviet initiatives
44
It should be noted that over 50% of Soviet veto's within this period were
registered over questions of increasing the membership of the UN. From 1945
until 1955 the Security Council, namely, the U.S. coalition and Russia, was unable
to overcome the stalemate of admitting nations which belonged to either the West
or East bloc into the UN. The Soviet means of blocking application rested solely
on the use of the veto, while the U.S. strategy simply relied on the inability of the
Soviet Union to garner the seven necessary votes for membership
recommendation from the Security Council. For a brief discussion of this
stalemate see; a. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations: Principles and Issues
(Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1991), 74-77, and Swords Into
Plowshares, 88-93.
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through the use of a "hidden veto.' The relevance of this type of action can
still be felt in the present day "politics" in the UN, and it must be remembered
that a future Russian government may feel the need to block "aggressive Western
policy" in the UN through this tried and true practice of confrontation in the
Security Council. Especially when actions within the Security Council may be
deemed incongruent with the future Russian national interest (whatever that
might be).
While one should not be so quick as to dismiss confrontational policies
based on the clash of ideologies, we should also recognize the important role that
confrontational policies have with regard to the maintenance of national security
in international organizations.46 In the end, the use of the veto in the Security
Council should be viewed as just another means of "protecting" national security
within the United Nations.
D. SOVIET DOMINANCE AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT
From 1957 forward a new voice was beginning to be heard in the UN, and
that was the collective group of the "non-aligned countries." This period
4oThis hidden veto entailed using Western majorities in the Security Council
to prevent the Soviets from gaining necessary support for its resolutions by the
practice of abstention or absence from proceedings, see; The Procedure of the UN
Security Council 223-232.
46
It should not be forgotten that this "policy of confrontation" in international
organizations was surely practiced by the U.S. Administration in the 1980's, see;
Allan Gerson, The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without, Apology America at
the United Nations 1981-1985 (New York: the Free Press, 1991).
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witnessed the UN membership increase from 51 countries in 1945 to 82 in 1957. 47
The majority of these countries, which comprised former Western colonies, joined
the non-aligned movement. By I960, the U.S. had effectively lost its assured
majority voting bloc to the non-aligned nations. Slowly the Soviets began to
maneuver closer to the non-aligned movement, eventually becoming their
"protector." In Khrushchev's words, the UN had become a, "struggle of the new
and progressive against the old and moribund."48 The UN was progressing from
the "two camps" view to the "three camps" view and the Soviets saw themselves
as not only the leader of the communist camp but also as the defacto leader of the
non-aligned camp. 49 It was the Soviets' view that,
the nonsocialist countries of Asia and Africa... are nearer to the peace-loving
position of the socialist states than to the aggressive position of the U.S.A.
and its allies on a number of international-affairs questions.''
The major weapon the Soviets used to fight for the support of the non-
aligned countries was found in the UN's "Special Committee on the Situation with
Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
47M. J. Peterson, The General Assembly in World Politics, (Boston: Allen &
Unwin, 1986), 12.
48
"The Soviet View of the United Nations," 21.
49For an outstanding review of Soviet activity during this period see,
"Shattered Illusions: The UN and the USSR," 90-111.
50The Soviet Union at the United Nations, 117.
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to Colonial Countries and Peoples/' commonly called the Committee of 24. With
Soviet leadership, the Committee of 24 was able to push through the General
Assembly two resolutions which would pave the way for cooperation between the
Soviet Union and "National Liberation Movements (NLM's)." The first resolution
stated, "all armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against
dependent people shall cease.' 01 The second resolution recognized the legitimate
right to self-determination and independence of people under colonial rule, and
authorized all states to provide "material and moral assistance" to the NLM's. 52
Armed with these resolutions, leadership of the Committee of 24 and a very
effective propaganda machine, the Soviets were able to partially win the favor of
the non-aligned countries and wrestle control of the General Assembly away from
the West.
While the non-aligned movement was gaining strength, the Soviet
government found itself embroiled in a battle to limit the strength of the UN's
Secretary-General. It should be noted this battle was not new, since the first UN
Conference in San Francisco, the Soviets sought to diffuse the power of the
Secretary-General. This campaign was, however, heightened by the UN
peacekeeping operation in the Congo and the emergence of the Secretary-




General's policy of "preventive diplomacy." 53 The UN peacekeeping mission to
the Congo was heavily criticized by the Soviet Government. 54 The Soviets felt
that Secretary-General Hammarskjold was responsible for the UN supporting the
wrong party in the Congo crisis (President Joseph Kasavubu instead of the Pro-
Soviet Premier Patrice Lumumba). Furthermore, Hammarskjold's actions in the
UN served to block Soviet support of the Lumumba faction. This infuriated the
Soviets (especially Khrushchev), and not only resulted in their refusal to finance
future UN peacekeeping ventures, but from this point forward they aggressively
moved to undermine the Secretary-General's personal power.
Khrushchev's, "troika proposal" was the means through which the Soviets
hoped to dilute the Secretary-General's power. The Soviets proposed to replace
the office of Secretary-General with, "a collective UN executive agency consisting
of three persons, each representing a definite group of states." 55 These persons
would be representatives from the three blocks within the UN (Western,
Communist and Non-aligned). The Soviets felt they could seriously influence two
'"'Preventive diplomacy" was the rubric under which Dag Hammarskjold,
Secretary-General, sought to overcome the confrontation of the Cold War and its
associated stalemate within the Security Council. His plan envisioned the use of
UN intervention (i.e. peacekeeping missions) into "neutral areas" with the hope
of forestalling "the competitive intrusion of the rival power blocs" in such areas.
The evolution of preventive diplomacy and recent Russian initiatives to bolster
its use will be discussed in depth in Chapter IV.
'"'For an outstanding review of Soviet objections to the Congo Mission
(ONUC) see; Swords Into Plowshares, 313-333, and The Soviet Union at the
United Nations, 140-151.
"The Soviet Union at the United Nations, 153.
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of the three proposed representatives, which assured their control of the
Secretariat. This attempt to undermine the Secretariat was unsuccessful, but a
few years later the Soviets were able to undermine the Secretariat in a more
damaging manner.
It was the policy of the UN to fill positions in the Secretariat with impartial
career civil servants "donated" from UN participant countries. The Soviet
government, however rejected this UN policy of career civil servants. Soviet
General-Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev stated, in 1961, that
the Soviet Government has now come to the conclusion that there can be no
such things as an impartial civil servant in this deeply divided world, and
that the kind of political celibacy which the British theory of the civil servant
calls for is in international affairs a fiction. ob
In 1978 former Soviet Under Secretary General, Arkady Shevchenko,
defected to the United States. He asserted that the Soviet government, through
its policy of "secondment," had indeed completely rejected this concept of
impartial UN civil servants. Shevchenko charged, "over a third of all communist
bloc nationals in the Secretariat are officers of their respective secret police, under
the direct guidance of the KGB."57 This "secondment policy" meant that Soviet
56
"The Soviet View of the United Nations," 34.
57
"Shattered Illusions: The UN and the USSR," 94. For the first hand account
of this policy see; Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, (New York:
Ballantine Books, 1985).
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diplomats to the UN were rotated frequently and kept on a very short leash.
Instead oi serving as impartial civil servants in the UN they were controlled by
the government through the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB.
This time frame also marked the disintegration of Sino-Soviet relations. A
one time ardent sponsor, in the UN, of the Peoples Republic of China, the Soviet
Union became one of China's most ardent foes. 58 In many instances in the UN,
since the late 1960's, the Soviets would take a more aggressive stance toward the
Chinese government than they would toward the American government. This
Sino-Soviet battle, was waged over numerous issues including; the Indo-Pakistani
War, disarmament, detente, Indochina, and Angola. Some of the most abusive
rhetoric in the UN has been conveyed between these two nations, which compete
for the favor of the non-aligned movement. The Soviets have labeled the Chinese
as coming from the "socialist betrayal camp," and "aspiring to the role of an
imperialist jester." 5 The Chinese, on the other hand, have warned of Soviet
imperialism stating,
In the current struggle against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism,
we developing countries must especially guard against the danger of letting
58Some have even stressed that the USSR and China, by the 1970's, had
considered each other "enemy number one," see; Soviet Foreign Policy Since
World War II, 279.
59William R. Feeney, "Sino-Soviet Competition in the United Nations," Asian
Survey 17 (September 1977), 812.
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the tiger [USSR] in through the back door while repulsing the wolf [U.S.]
through the front door. 60
Overall, this period witnessed Soviet attempts to undermine the effectiveness
of those UN bureaucracies and functions it could not completely control, namely,
peacekeeping missions and the office of the Secretary-General. 61 The Soviets also
sought to strengthen their security by embracing the non-aligned movement
which in the end would weaken the West's position in the UN. However, it
should be remembered that even by 1971 their was "little evidence that the Soviet
Union has abandoned the mentality of the permanent minority."62 A glimpse of
the Soviet voting record in the Security Council clearly suggests that not until the
60
Ibid., 822; emphasis added.
61During this second period of Soviet activity within the UN (1960-1985) Soviet
support of UN peacekeeping missions was limited to the United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF II) in 1973 and United Nations Disengagement Observer
Force (UNDOF) in 1974, both of which saw peacekeeping forces deployed to the
Middle East. From 1974-1988 the Soviets did not support UN peacekeeping
missions, see; Harold K. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence: International
Organizations and the Global Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc,
1984), 176-186; and Aleksandr M. Belonogov, "Soviet Peace-keeping Proposals,"
Survival 32, no. 3 (May/June 1990), 206-211.
62Swords Into Plowshares, 128. Claude also reminds us that, "Should the
USSR ever become a champion of majority rule in the United Nations, this might
well be regarded as cause for dismay rather than delight in the West—for it would
be less likely to reflect a Soviet conversion to higher principles of political
morality than a Soviet conviction that the Communist bloc had gained, or was on
the verge of gaining, a dominate position in the United Nations," 129. Although
the Soviets never completely championed complete majority rule, they certainly
attained a dominate position by the late 1970's.
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late 1970's had another permanent member of the Security Council overtaken the
Soviet's historical reputation of "Mr. Nyet," see Table 2. b*
TABLE 2
VETO'S IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY COUNTRY: 1960-1985
(^s in parenthesis represent percentage of veto's)
# of Veto's USA UK France China USSR
1960-1964 1 16 (94%)
1965-1969 2 (100%)
1970-1974 7 (24%) 8 (28%) 1 4* 9 (31%)
1975-1979 15 (52%) 5 6 1 2 (7%)
1980-1984 23 (43%) 5 4 16** 5 (9%)
* Peoples Republic of China assumes position in the Security Council.
** All 16 votes cast in opposition to appointment of Secretary-General
Waldheim.
Source: The Procedures of the UN Security Council, 205-208.
The rise of the non-aligned movement allowed the Soviets to gain control
of the UN or at the very least deny control of the UN to the Western bloc.
However, between the mid-1970's and mid-1980's the Soviets were faced with the
increasing influence the Chinese had in relation to the non-aligned movement in
63The term "Mr. Nyet" refers to the numerous veto's registered by Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the Security Council.
31
the UN. Furthermore, this period witnessed U.S. withdrawal from UN activities
and instead increasingly undertake unilateral actions abroad (i.e. the Vietnam
War, "invading" Latin America, intervening in Grenada, bombing Libya, and
financing insurgents in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua). These factors,
combined with the change in leadership in the Soviet Union and the erosion of
its economy forced the Soviets to rethink their UN strategy of "confrontation with
the West."
E. NEW THINKING AND THE UNITED NATIONS
The final period of Soviet policy in the UN began in the late-1980's and
continued until the disintegration of the Union (December of 1991). Increasingly,
the Soviets retreated from their previous policies of confrontation and conflict,
and developed a policy of cooperation within the UN. On September 17th, 1987,
Mikhail Gorbachev advanced this new policy in an article in Prnvda entitled,
"Realities and Guarantees for a Secure World." This new UN policy was
predicated on his "new thinking" views, and called for enhancing the activities of
the UN. From 1987-1991 the changing Soviet strategy in the UN was staggering.
By 1990, the Soviets and the Americans were voting together on 75% of UN
resolutions, this can be compared to 1981 statistics, in which their views only
coincided 17.6% of the time (usually on budgetary or administrative matters). 64
b4For 1981 statistics see, Pilon, 95. For 1990 statistics refer to; Boris Pyadyshev
et al., eds., "45th Session of the UN General Assembly," International Affairs
(Moscow) 10 (October 1990): 64.
Furthermore, it should be noted that with the end of the cold war there has not
been a single veto in the Security Council since 31 May 1990. 65
From the inception of Gorbachev's new UN policy, the usual rhetoric toward
the West was conspicuously absent, Soviet officials continually down played past
confrontational attitudes toward the West. Historically, the concept of
international interdependence, was "totally unacceptable" to the Soviets.
However, in July of 1989, Eduard Shevardnadze stated, "the confrontation
between the two systems [capitalism and communism] can no longer be looked
upon as the dominant tendency of the current epoch...," for him the dominant
theme was, "the growing tendency towards mutual interdependence of states in
world society...."66 Even though Shevardnadze may have felt confrontation had
not disappeared, he did feel it was replaced by a more dominant theme,
cooperation. Furthermore, after that statement was issued, Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze increasingly called for "interdependence" and dismissed the concept
of two ideologically different "camps."
b5-
'This new era of cooperation, within the UN, was highlighted in a recent
report by Secretary General Boutros Ghali, see; United Nations, Secretary-General,
An Agenda For Peace, (A/47/277) 17 June 1992.
"Jonathan Haslam, "The UN and the Soviet Union: New Thinking?,"
International Affairs (London) 65 (Autumn 1989): 678. To be fair, Haslam was
still undecided when this article was published as to "how absolute the Soviet
commitment" was to "lasting accommodation with the capitalist world." He felt
much of the Soviet cooperation was an attempt to seek prolonged breathing-space
in international affairs.
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Although this period saw the anti-West rhetoric of the Soviet Union
diminish, it was most importantly marked by reversals in previous Soviet UN
policies (i.e. support of peacekeeping missions, nonpayment of debts,
disarmament, human rights, international law and UN organization). The UN's
role in negotiating a Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan was instrumental
in changing the Soviets' negative attitude toward UN peacekeeping. 67 The
Soviets started to view peacekeeping as a very cost effective way of maintaining
peace, and extricating themselves from very costly adventures (Afghanistan,
Angola and Namibia). Since 1987, the Soviets supported all UN peacekeeping
operations and were one of the leading proponents in the UN with regard to
increasing the role of peacekeeping. 68 In addition to this dramatic reversal of
UN peacekeeping policy, the Soviets promised to resume all funding to the UN,
including peacekeeping operations. 69 By 1990 the Soviets had reduced their
As suggested by then Chief of the International Organizations Department
of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev (currently Russian
Foreign Minister), see; Kozyrev, "The USSR's New Approach to the UN,"
International Affairs (Moscow) 7 (July 1990), 16-19; and Kozyrev, "The New Soviet
Attitude Toward the United Nations," Washington Quarterly, Summer 1990, 41-53.
6bFor a more detailed explanation see; "Soviet Peace-Keeping Proposals," 206-
211; Augustus R. Norton and Thomas G. Weiss, "Superpowers and Peace-
Keepers," Survival 32 (May/June 1990): 212-220; Vladimir Petrovsky, "Towards
Comprehensive Security Through the Enhancement of the Role of the United
Nations," Alternative, XV, no. 2 (Spring 1990), 241-245, and Petrovsky, "United
Nations Perspective: Preventive Diplomacy," in The United Nations in Conflict
Management: American, Soviet and Third World Views edited by Thomas G.
Weiss, (New York: The International Peace Academy, Inc., 1990), 77-82.
69
"The UN and the Soviet Union: New Thinking?," 681.
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outstanding debts for peacekeeping operations from about $200 million to $125
million. 70
In the area of disarmament, the Soviets proposed that the UN, "certify
compliance with arms-control agreements through a variety of multilateral
verification means ..." 71 This is noteworthy in that it represents another complete
reversal for the Soviets, not only regarding verification, but also in their call for
a multilateral commission. Formerly, the Soviets only proposed rhetorical
disarmament proposals, such as, "no first-strike agreements," or agreements that
did not include meaningful verification proposals.
The largest reversal in Soviet policy dealt with UN human rights proposals.
The Soviets intended to,
broaden its participation in the control mechanism for human rights at the
UN and within the framework of the European process.... For us, it is of
principled importance to fully bring domestic legislation and practice in the
USSR in line with international commitments in this sphere. 72
70Meryl A. Kessler and Thomas G. Weiss, "Moscow's U.N. Policy," Foreign
Policy, 79 (Summer 1990): 99. Current Russian debt will be discussed in Chapter
V.
71Emphasis added; Toby Trister Gati and Edward C. Luck, "Gorbachev, the
United Nations, and U.S. Policy," Washington Quarterly, (Autumn 1988): 22.
Some experts maintained that these were simply a continuation of "meaningless
nuclear initiatives" on the part of the Soviets, see; Richard N. Perle, "Clarity, Arms
Control, and NATO Strategy," in On Not Confusing Ourselves, edited by Andrew
W. Marshall, J.J. Martin and Henry S. Rowen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1991), 145-157.
72
"The USSR's New Approach to the UN," 18.
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This is a complete reversal from the previous held view that human rights
are a domestic concept protected by Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, hence, free
of intervention from the UN. Similarly, the Soviets reversed prior policy and
called for a more active Secretary-General leading the UN in a more
comprehensive system of security. 73
F. CONCLUSIONS
Whether it was peacekeeping proposals or human rights legislation, the
Soviet Union reversed many previously held positions. It seemed the Soviet
policy of confrontation based on the clash of ideologies was on the way out and
cooperation based on a sense of survival was on the way in.
Why the sudden change in Soviet policy in the United Nations? A major
reason must have been the Soviets' previously mentioned need to seek "breathing
space" in the international arena. Gorbachev's domestic commitment to reform
was to take center stage of Soviet policy.74 In order to accomplish domestic
reforms the Soviets would have to retain numerous economic resources that
otherwise would have been committed to Soviet foreign interests. Therefore, the
Soviets saw international multilateral negotiation as a way to fill the vacuum left
73
See; Thomas M. Franck, "Soviet Initiative: U.S. Responses-New
Opportunities for Reviving the United Nations System," American Tournal of
International Law, 83 (July 1989): 531-543.
74
"The New Soviet Attitude," 41-46.
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by their shrinking foreign "influence." 75 Furthermore, the Soviets must have felt
a need to expand the role of multilateralism in the UN to contain U.S.
unilateralism abroad (i.e. Libya, Grenada, Panama, state-supported "freedom-
fighters"). As Shevardnadze pointed out to the UN General Assemblv,
if [the UN's] organizational aspects of countering threats to peace had been
worked out, there would now be no need for individual states to act
unilaterally; after all, however justified they might be, such actions provoke
a mixed response and create problems for those same states and may not be
acceptable to all. 76
Afghanistan provided one of the first examples of how the UN could assist
the Soviets in extricating themselves from costly military/economic adventures,
while still maintaining "face." 77 By increasing their influence in the UN, the
7Tor similar viewpoints see; John Q. Blodgett, "The Future of UN
Peacekeeping," Washington Quarterly, (Winter 1991), 210; "Moscow's U.N. Policy;"
"Gorbachev, the United Nations, and U.S. Policy," and Thomas G. Weiss, ed.,
"America, Soviet and Third World Views About International Conflict
Management," The United Nations in Conflict Management: American, Soviet and
Third World Views (New York: The International Peace Academy, In., 1990), 30-
36.
' 6
"The Rebirth of the U.N.," as delivered by Soviet Foreign Minster, Eduard
Shevardnadze to the UN General Assembly on 25 September 1990, (Vital Speeches
of the Day, LVII, no. 1, 15 October 1990: 10.
"Kozyrev contends that the Afghanistan settlement provided the Soviets and
the UN with a "detonator" which "started a peaceful chain reaction," see; "The
Soviet Union and the United Nations." Recently, however, he has maintained that
Gorbachev "lacked the spirit to move not in words but in deeds," see; Andrei
Kozyrev, "Transformation or Kafkaesque Metamorphosis. Russia's Democratic
Foreign Policy and Its Priorities," Nezavisimax/a Gazetci, 20 August 1992, 1, 4 (FBIS-
SOV-92-167, 27 August 1992, 21).
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Soviets were able to maintain a large portion of their dwindling international
power and influence.
Finally, the Soviets felt that fostering a sense of cooperation with the West
in the UN could open doors for them in other international organizations such as;
GATT, IMF and the World Bank. In the end, renewed Soviet cooperation in the
UN caused many people to reconsider the Soviet Union's foreign policy
objectives, not to mention the importance of the United Nations.
Today, the Russian Government finds itself confronted not only with many
of the same problems of the former Soviet Union but also struggling with new
problems as well. Furthermore, many of the governmental architects of this
Soviet cooperative policy toward the UN still occupy important positions in the
Russian government. Will Russia continue with the cooperative polices of the
recent Soviet regime or will they return to those confrontational policies of the
distant past? In the early years of the UN, the Soviet Union engaged in a policy
of confrontation because it found itself in the minority aligned against hostile
"Western ideology." It was not until the mid-1980's, that the Soviets engaged in
cooperative policies with the West, albeit, some might say, to gain "breathing
space" in the international arena. It might very well be true that in the late 1980's
and early 1990's the Soviets had nothing to gain by
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continued policies of confrontation and isolation, and a great deal to be
gained by abandoning confrontation and joining the mainstream of Western-
dominated international society. 78
However, one cannot be assured that this statement holds the same
relevance today. Certainly, many Russian officials deem cooperation in the
international arena as the only means of rebuilding Russia and they feel that
cooperation in the UN is one such vehicle. Nevertheless, because some Russians
feel the West is still an adversary to be confronted, cooperative policies with
historic "Western institutions," like the United Nations, are not assured. 79 While
the history of Soviet involvement in the UN gives us many reasons to assume a
continued cooperative policy on the part of the Russian government, current
domestic reality within the Russian nation suggests that cooperation might not be
a guaranteed reality.
78Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet
Change," International Security 16, no. 3 (Winter 1991/92), 114.
79
Illustrative of this are the views of former KGB General Aleksandr Sterligov
who considers "the invasion of Yugoslavia by NATO [and UN] troops and
genocide against our Serbian brothers as encroachment upon Russia," see
statement released by Russian National Sobor press center INTERFAX, 1405
GMT, 13 August 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-158, 14 August 1992, 7).
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III. CHANGING OF THE GUARD
A. INTRODUCTION
After the August coup, Soviet relations entered a transitional period in the
United Nations. This period witnessed a battle between the Soviet Union which
was attempting to consolidate its power and the individual republics who sought
to legitimize their independence in the international arena by attaining
membership in the UN. The ensuing battle during this transitional period would
be waged over which republics should be considered "continuer states" and which
republics should be considered "successor states."80 Russia's final emergence as
the inheritor of the Soviet position within the UN came as no great shock to the
international community, and was even hastened by many of the Soviet Union's
"former enemies."
Nevertheless, Russia's emergence as the sole inheritor of Soviet
responsibilities within the UN, and specifically the Security Council, does not
automatically bring with it the guarantee of a continuation of cooperative policies.
Even though many of the officials who managed Gorbachev's cooperative policy
80
"Successor states" would take on the legal commitments, international rights
and obligations of the former Soviet Union, while a "continuer state" would be
that single state which would assume the Soviets' "position" in all international
organizations, see; "On the International Legal Status of Russia and Other
Members of the CIS as Successors to the USSR," Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, no. 3, 15
February 1992, 28-29 (FBIS-USR-92-004-L, 29 April 1992, 1), and "Russia Debates
Its Own National Interest," 43.
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within the UN remain in position in the Yeltsin government, it should be
emphasized that today, these officials continually find themselves under attack
from elements both within and outside the Yeltsin government. At the heart of
this attack are questions regarding the focus of the emerging Russian foreign
policy, namely whether it should be "Atlanticist" or "Eurasian" in nature. 81
This chapter will briefly highlight the Russian assumption of power within
the United Nations. It will also cover those variables which will impact upon the
emerging Russian policy regarding the UN, namely, the emerging foreign policy
debate within the Russian nation and the individuals who are likely to draft
future Russian UN policy.
The continuation of a cooperative Russian policy in the UN is dependent not
only upon Russia's emergence as the inheritor of the Soviet position and power
in the UN but it is also dependent upon a Russian need to cooperate. It remains
to be seen if that need truly does exist.
B. RUSSIA ASSUMES THE SEAT
As early as September of 1991, Soviet officials were discussing the possibility
of Russia taking over the Soviets' position in the UN, specifically, the Security
xlFor an outstanding discussion of these differences see; Alexander Rahr,
"'Atlanticists' Versus 'Eurasians' in Russian Foreign Policy," RFE/RL Research
Report 1, no. 22 (29 May 1992), 17-22, and "Russia Looks at the World,"
Economist, 4 July 1992, 19-24.
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Council.82 However, during the transition period between the Soviet Union's
deterioration and the emergence of a new union structure, Soviet leadership
maintained control over the UN policy. As for the former Soviet republics
gaining individual membership in the UN, the Soviet leadership stated,
a common understanding has been reached among the republics that the
union must keep its place in the Security Council. If the republics become
members of the United Nations, they will be represented at the General
Assembly.**
Russian officials deemed it more important to work toward "preserving the
union" or failing that, work toward the formation of a "renovated union" instead
of establishing a separate Russian membership to the UN. 84 Furthermore,
Russian officials felt that Russia would be effectively represented by the Soviet
government (or any other subsequent union) in the UN. This stance was later
82
In early September of 1991, Soviet Foreign Ministry official, Yuri Fedotov
stated that the Russian Federation could become the legitimate successor of the
Soviet Union in international affairs. See; "Official on Baltic Independence,
Russian Supremacy," KYODO, 1102 GMT, 5 September 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-173, 6
September 1991, 62-63). For an outstanding review of the events leading up to
the Russian assumption of the Soviet seat within the United Nations see; Ted
Daley, Russia's "Continuation" of the Soviet Security Council Membership and
Prospective Russian Policies Toward the United Nations, The RAND/UCLA
Center for Soviet Studies, March 1992.
83My emphasis, remarks made by former First Deputy Foreign Minister,
Vladimir F. Petrovsky, "Petrovsky Remarks on Republic's UN Membership,"
TASS, 0530 GMT, 25 October 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-208, 28 October 1991, 8).
84Mikhail Kochetkov, "Russian Delegation Discusses UN Membership," TASS,
0750 GMT, 20 September 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-183, 20 September 1991, 2).
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modified, in that the Russian government would not rule out the possibility of
future Russian membership to the UN. 85
During this transition period, Soviet officials felt that one of their primary
functions in the UN was to reassure the world that democratic transformation
was proceeding smoothly within the Soviet Union. In fact, this point was the
primary message delivered to the 46th meeting of the UN General Assembly by
Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boris Pankin. Pankin stressed that the
emerging Union of Sovereign States (later the Commonwealth of Independent
States or CIS) was the rightful successor to the Soviet Union and hence would
continue the Soviet policies of cooperation and goodwill in the UN. 86
In late December, with the rapid decline of the Soviet state structure, Russia
surfaced as the obvious successor to the Soviet Union within the United Nations.
On December 16th, with little apparent disagreement of the other republics of the
Soviet Union, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced that Russia intended to
"continue" in place of the Soviet government in the UN.87 This announcement
was followed by the CIS founding accord, signed in Alma Ata on 21 December
1991, which completely supported Russia
S3!
"For examples of these views see comments made by the personal
representative of the Russian President, Valeriy Burkov in, "Russian Delegation
Discusses UN Membership," or "Kolosovskiy on UN Bid, Relations With
Republics," INTERFAX, 1437 GMT, 13 September 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-179, 16
September 1991, 75).
86
"The Dangers of Nationalism," 5-8.
^Russia's "Continuation" of the Soviet Security Council Membership, " 4.
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in its assumption of the USSR's membership in the United Nations,
including permanent membership in the Security Council and other
international organizations. 88
This in turn was followed by the delivery of a letter from the Russian
President to the UN Secretary-General "informing him that the Russian Federation
was assuming the USSR's membership in the United Nations...."89 Based on
legal advice from the UN's Secretariat, the Secretary-General forwarded this letter
to all members of the UN, noting that it was "informative in nature, that it
constituted reality, and that it did not require formal approval on the part of the
United Nations."90 While there were many questions involving the actual
legality of these actions, the "simple logic and workability" of them probably had
much to do with Russia's acceptance in the UN.91 It should also be remembered
that Russia's inheritance of the Soviet seat in the Security Council was fully
supported by the other members on the Council who in fact moved swiftly to
ensure that Russia, as the most powerful of the Soviet Republics, retained the seat
of the former Union. This move, by the Security Council, reflected the geo-
political importance of the emerging Russian republic in the international arena.
88






This view is convincingly argued by Daley in Russia's "Continuation" of the
Soviet Security Council Membership, 4-8.
44
However, the action was also undertaken quickly to forestall any possible
international movement to change the existing UN Charter (i.e. reorganization of
the Security Council as a whole). 92 As Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev
reminds us, the Russian government's inheritance of "the status and privileges"
of Soviet government was by no means "automatic," in fact the inheritance of the
USSR's position "was worked out by Russian diplomats in the closest contact with
their English and other Western colleagues."93 As an aside, it was through
cooperation like this, between Russia and the West, that led many world leaders
to speak of a new era of cooperation in the Security Council.94
In this new era of cooperation, Russia has retained the Soviet seat on the
Security Council and reaffirmed the international obligations of the former Soviet
Union. As the heir apparent to the former Soviet government, which itself
progressed from a policy of confrontation to one of cooperation, it will now be
92i
"Its important to note that the Security Council conferred membership upon
the Russian Federation when the General Assembly was out of session.
Furthermore, the Security Council did not actively seek the advice nor consent of
the General Assembly. See; Paul Lewis, "West Acts to Defer U.N. Council Issue,"
New York Times, 3 January 1992, A4.
93"This has been stressed by Kozyrev in "Transformation or Kafkaesque
Metamorphosis."
94
This sentiment was expressed during the Security Council summit meeting
on 31 January 1992, see, "Excerpts From Speeches by Leaders of Permanent
Members of U.N. Council," New York Times, 1 February 1992, 5, and the Security
Council's Summit Declaration entitled "New Risks for Stability and Security,"
New York Times, 1 February 1992, 4.
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up to the Russian government to develop a policy in this international
organization.
C NEW RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY
Predicting any sort of future in the Russian federation should be viewed as
a very tenuous undertaking, simply because the Russian people and their would-
be leaders are themselves unsure of the direction the country should take. This
lack of vision is clearly illustrated in the ongoing battle within the Russian
government regarding the formation of a foreign policy agenda. At the heart of
this debate is whether or not Russian foreign policy should be primarily focused
on expanding positive relations with the West (the "Atlanticist" approach) or
primarily focused on relations nearer home, namely with the republics of the
former Soviet Union (the "Eurasianist" approach). Until recent months the
"Atlanticist" approach has completely dominated Russian foreign policy.93
The outcome of this foreign policy debate is important in the international
arena because each approach would bring with it differences regarding the
establishment of a Russian policy toward the United Nations. While neither
foreign policy agenda focuses on establishing overtly hostile policies toward the
West, the "Atlanticist" approach certainly envisions a closer and more cooperative
working relationship with the West.
9:This foreign policy was detailed to the public by Andrei Kozyrev in his
article entitled "Challenge of Transformation," Izvestiya, 1 April 1992, 6 (FBIS-SOV-
92-063, 1 April 1992, 18-21).
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In January of 1991, as Russia emerged as the rightful successor to the Soviet
Union its foreign policy priorities seemed to be threefold.96 First, they sought
to "safeguard the continuity" of the state. Secondly, to maintain "the legacy of the
positive gains achieved by Gorbachev," namely, the cooperative relationship with
the West. And finally, to seek the development of "initiatives. ..depending
considerably on the country's internal development," in other words a policy
aimed at furthering the economic and political reforms undertaken by the Russian
government. Although, Kozyrev did discuss establishing a "zone of good-
neighborliness" with the republics of the former Soviet Union, the primary
emphasis of this emerging foreign policy was in the establishment of fruitful
relations with the West.
The major reason for the domination of this Atlantic philosophy deals with
Russia's initial goal of establishing a place in the international arena for an
emerging Russian nation. The first and clearly most important priority of
Russia's foreign policy was to see that "Russia quickly entered the world
community and received recognition as one of the leading powers in the
world."9 The Russian government felt it must "show in practice that our state
9()T
'For a discussion of these priorities see "Challenge of Transformation," and
Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Sergey Yastrembski, Expresso, 1500 GMT, 3 April
1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-065, 3 April 1992, 22-23).
97Ednan Agayev, advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, contends that this
first stage of foreign policy has indeed been completed, see; Agayev, "Russia-
Above All Else," Moskovskiye Novosti, no. 18, 3 May 1992, 12 (FBIS-USR-92-083, 3
July 1992, 1).
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has renounced all imperial ambitions and is being guided by legitimate
interests.
"
4h Along these lines, President Yeltsin considered it Russia's obligation
to
continue the constructive changes in the USSR's course of foreign policy
which have been initiated in recent years. Not to alter that direction, not to
back off from what has been done in a constructive way, but on the
contrary, to enrich it and implement the declarations 99
The cooperative nature of this "Atlanticist" foreign policy was born out of
a need to use the Western world as a legitimizing force in the establishment of
the Russian state. However, it should not be ignored that this policy of
cooperation also brought with it the hope of Western financial assistance in
rebuilding the Russian nation. As Russian Ambassador to the U.S., Vladimir
Lukin, pointed out to the Russian people, "...the World is interdependent....We
will not extricate ourselves on our own. ...No country in the era of
interdependence has emerged from a crisis without outside assistance." Lukin
maintained that it would therefore be up to the Russian leadership, through a
policy of cooperation, to gain assistance from the international community to help
48
Ibid.
"Emphasis added, statement by Yeltsin in, "Russia Cannot Be Put Back in a
Cell."
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rebuild the Russian nation. 100 It was in this environment that the "Atlanticist"
foreign policy would dominate. 101
Finally, it is important to note that many key supporters of this Western
oriented policy were also major supporters of a cooperative policy in the UN;
namely, Russian Ambassador to the United Nations, Yulii Vorontsov, Vladimir
Lukin, Andrei Kozyrev and Vladimir Petrovsky. 102 In the end, this continuity
of key UN /Russian officials may serve to increase the possibility of a continued
policy of cooperation in the UN especially given that all of these officials
supported the cooperative polices of Gorbachev regarding the United Nations.
IOOtRecently Lukin (as well as many other "Atlanticists") has modified his
position and called for a foreign policy more independent from the West. He has
started to emphasize a policy that is a "combination of strategic dependence and
self-sufficiency." Lukin now feels that Russia's "new mission" is to become the
"guarantor of stability throughout the Eurasian heartland through its own
democratic revival." However, in the end he still stresses the need for a
partnership with those democracies of the West. For examples of these views see;
Vladimir Lukin, "America and Our Reforms: The United States Supports Russia
for its Scrupulous Commitment to Democracy," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 September
1992, 4 (FBIS-USR-92-126, 2 October 1992, 51-54), and' Lukin, "Our Security
Predicament," Foreign Policy, no. 88 (Fall 1992), 57-75.
101This is not to say that this "Atlanticist" foreign policy was completely
removed from the historic traditions of the Westernizing-Slavophile debate.
However the desperate need for Western assistance in legitimizing an emerging
nation was certainly a new and important aspect of the old debate.
102 For a brief explanation of these key personnel (with the exception of
Lukin) and their ties to the UN see; Russia's "Continuation" of the Soviet Security
Council Membership ." For a brief discussion of Lukin's early positions regarding
cooperation with the West see; Vladimir Lukin, "No Kicking the Golden Platter,"
interviewed by Aleksey Pozin, Federatsiya, no. 17, 15-21 April 1992, 5 (FBIS-SOV-
92-062, 27 May 1992, 13-15), and Vladimir Lukin "Embassy's Face Must Be
Updated," interviewed by Ivan Lebedev, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 1st ed., 15 April 1992,
7 (FBIS-SOV-92-074, 16 April 1992, 20-21).
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As the Russian nation solidified its position as the "legitimate successor" of
the Soviet state, many officials within the Russian government questioned the
merits of continuing the strict "Atlanticist" approach to foreign policy. Many felt
that Russia should instead establish a "Eurasian" approach to foreign policy. It
was felt that since Russia was now considered a legitimate state it should turn its
foreign policy aims closer to home and develop a coherent policy regarding
relations with the nations comprising the Commonwealth of Independent States.
As this "Eurasianist" policy has gained strength, primarily from the
nationalists and conservatives within the government, the Russian Foreign
Ministry, which has continued to support an "Atlanticist" policy, has increasingly
come under attack. Some of the most outspoken critics of the Foreign Ministry's
Atlantic bias have been the members in Russia's parliament. These officials have
accused Yeltsin's government, and more specifically his Foreign Affairs Ministry
of "blindly comparing itself to the West." 103 Although the Parliament has not
been alone in its attacks on the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, it has been
extremely active in calling for the resignation of Andrei Kozyrev, who is viewed
as the embodiment of this misguided policy. 104 In addition to seeking Kozyrev'
s
103Vladimir Volzhskiy, "There Will Be No Winners in This Battle. The 'War'
Between Parliament and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia for Primacy in
the Development of the Foreign Political Strategy Continues," Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
25 July 1992, 4 (FBIS-SOV-92-103, 14 August 1992, 58."
104Two of the major officials who have been rumored to succeed Kozyrev are
Yulii Vorontsov (which is interesting because of his Western affiliations) and the
Presidential Counselor for Political Affairs, Sergei Stankevich, who is one of the
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resignation, Russian "Eurasianists" have attempted to undermine the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs power by establishing a Ministry for CIS Affairs. Even though
this new Ministry has yet to be developed, it was hoped that this effort toward
the establishment of a new Ministry would serve to focus attention on those
problems "near abroad." 10 ''
An emerging "Eurasian" foreign policy does not necessarily spell the
beginning of a new era of confrontation with the West or with the UN. The
primary spokesman for this Eurasian policy, within Yeltsin's government, Sergei
Stankevich has asserted that Russia needs a foreign policy which would be
representative of "the new balance of Western and Eastern orientations." 106 In
other words, Stankevich and the other "Eurasianists" have argued for a foreign
policy which would increase the emphasis of those relationships within the
CIS. 107 While Stankevich notes that the "Atlanticist" or Western policy is
key supporters of an "Eurasianist" foreign policy and who has continually
attacked Kozyrev for not having a "clear concept of Russian foreign policy." For
a brief review of these attacks see; "'Atlanticists' Versus 'Eurasians" in Russian
Foreign Policy, 19-22," and Sergei Stankevich, "Opinion—Sergei Stankevich,
Advisor to the Russian Federation President: So Far No One has Managed to
Exclude Force From the Political Arsenal," Izvestiya, 8 July 1992, 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-
133, 10 July 1992, 34-36).
105
See; Suzanne Crow, "Russia Prepares to Take a Hard Line on 'Near
Abroad'," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 32 (14 August 1992), 21-24.
106Sergei Stankevich, "Russia in Search of Itself," National Interest, no. 28,
Spring 1992, 48.
107
It should be noted that this policy of increasing relations with the CIS is
certainly supported by the Russian public who overwhelmingly feel (nearly 2 to
1 when compared with the next highest nation, the U.S.) that relations with the
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"rational, pragmatic and natural" because it brings with it "credit, aid and
advanced technology" he feels Russia must further develop it relationship with
those nations comprising of the CIS. 108 The emphasis is not to establish policy
with regard to the republics of the former Soviet Union at the expense of a
Western policy, but it is to increase the emphasis of Eurasian relationships as a
whole.
While this "Eurasian" viewpoint does not necessarily bring with it a hardline
stance toward the West, one cannot help but be impressed with the "Eurasianists"
desire to take a hardline approach to its relations with the East. Stankevich
himself asserts that it is "time for Russia to adopt a tougher tone" with those CIS
nations who are violating the rights of Russian minorities residing within the
republics of the former Soviet Union. 109 And it is this "hardline" attitude which
could possible usher in a new era of confrontation with the West. Especially if
the Russian government embarks upon an overtly hostile relationship regarding
its CIS neighbors under some rubric of human rights violations. However, this
possibility should not be overstated. Surely, if the "Eurasianist" school of thought
CIS countries are the "main concern of the Russian Government," see; Boris
Grushin, "Russian Foreign Policy: Priorities and Evaluations," Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
24 July 1992, 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-102, 59).
108"Russia in Search of Itself," 48.
109tRussian policies toward minority human rights violations will be discussed
in greater detail in Chapter IV, as the Russian government feels this is a grave
security concern for the future. For Stankevich's comments regarding this policy
see; "Russia in Search of Itself," 49-51. This emerging hardline stance is also
discussed in "Russia Prepares to Take a Hard Line on 'Near Abroad'."
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comes to dominate Russian foreign policy the West should expect a firmer
Russian policy regarding those states nearer its borders. However, this firm
stance does not guarantee a confrontational Russia attitude in the UN, nor does
it guarantee an unreasonable policy towards its immediate neighbors. Russia
might very well modify its behavior toward the CIS if for no other reason than
to avoid alienating themselves in the international arena, especially given the
current Russian reliance on Western cooperation. In the end, the "return of the
Russian veto" is doubtful in the near term if for no other reason than Russia's
dependence on Western aid, for without this aid Russia may very well "continue
to be a nation in decline." 110
Although, conservatives in the Russian government continue to get political
mileage from statements that suggest that the "United State's actions and
intentions unequivocally suggest that Russia is still it potential enemy...." 111 it
should be remembered that this is not the dominant feeling in the government.
Most Russian officials agree that Russian foreign policy has
110This is forcefully argued by Taley, see; Russia's Continuation of the Security
Council Membership, 16-17.
inEduard Volodin, "In the Planet's Mirror: Our 'Potential All/ is Watchful,"
Sovetskaya Rossiya, 24 March 1992, 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-059, 26 March 1992, 27).
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lost its ideological dogma and constraint and is based today, to a large
extent, on Russia's practical interests primarily connected to the economic
and political changes taking place in Russia. 112
The remaining foreign policy debate seems to be focused on defining those
practical interests. For the "Atlanticists," those interests rest primarily in the West.
For the "Eurasianists," those interests are to be found much closer to home. In
both cases those interests don't seem to be closely related within the old East-
West debate. However, it should be mentioned that in the future one can not
simply dismiss the chance of a fanatical conservative movement emerging in
Russian which would seek to return to the confrontational ways of the past to
"simply demonstrate national pride and independence." 113 Nevertheless,
Russia's current government still appears to be committed to cooperation in the
UN. Andrei Kozyrev's recent pledge to continue support for the Secretary-
General's proposed "Agenda for Peace," and for "the proposals which were but
forwarded yesterday [21 SEP 92] by U.S. President George Bush" is one such
example of this commitment to cooperation with the West within the United
Nations. 114
112Gennadii Burbulis, "Does Russia Have a Foreign Policy," interviewed by
V.T. Tretyakov, Russian Television Network, 1445 GMT, 3 June 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-
109, 5 June 1992, 23).
mRussia's "Continuation" of the Soviet Security Council Membership , 17.
114Andrei Kozyrev, speech delivered to the 46th session of the UN General
Assembly in New York on 22 September 1992, ITAR-TASS World Service, 0955
GMT, 22 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-185, 23 September 1992, 8).
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D. CONCLUSIONS
The emergence of a foreign policy debate within Russia has served to
sharpen the difference between the various constituencies in the Russian
federation. It has also served to illustrate the future importance of parliamentary
and public opinion with regard to foreign policy decisions in Russia. As Sergei
Lavrov, Chief of the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry International Organizations
Administration, correctly pointed out, the Russian Parliament may indeed "have
the last word" when it comes to Russian commitments in the UN. 113 It is
important to note that if in fact Russia decides upon a path of confrontation in the
UN it may do so for reasons completely different than those of the previous
Soviet government. Russia's path of confrontation might be pursued not because
of historical East-West geo-strategic realities, but instead because of domestic
political infighting which focuses on winning the support of the Russian public.
Although a policy of confrontation would probably be shrouded in the language
of East-West competition, at its heart would be the realities of a domestic battle
for control of the nation.
If one is to thoroughly judge Russian intentions in the UN the first place to
start should be in the area of security matters, for it is in this area that Russia has
115Sergei Lavrov, "Diplomat Speaks-United Nations: Second Wind," Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, 1st ed., 24 January 1992, 5 (FBIS-SOV-92-016, 29-30). The Russian
Parliament's influence over matters of foreign policy was also witnessed when it
"rejected" a Foreign Ministry documented submitted to them entitled "On the
Concept of Russian Foreign Policy," see; "Russia Debates Its National Interests,"
44-45.
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been the most active and it was also in this area that the former Soviet Union was
the most confrontational. Another such "litmus test" which could measure
Russia's commitment to cooperation might focus on whether or not Russian
diverts a portion of its scarce revenue toward repayment of its outstanding UN
debts. 116 In the end, it remains to be seen if Russia's actions will indeed be in
line with its stated intentions of cooperation. Close observance of Russian
activities in the UN should certainly clue observers in on Russia's true intentions.
The UN's role in the "maintenance of international peace and security" was
clearly the focus of Andrei Kozyrev's recent address to the UN and it also seems
to be the current focus of many other important UN members. A close study of
Russian actions, initiatives and motivations in the area of security should go along
way toward establishing a model for Russia's future cooperative or
confrontational behavior in the United Nations.
116t
'Russian officials have stated that between September 1992 and March 1993
Russian will pay the UN $130 million to be used toward the settlement of past
debts, see Kozyrev's comments to the 47th General Assembly (FBIS-SOV-92-185,
23 September 1992, 10). Unfortunately, this "litmus test" has limited application.
A Russian failure to make good on its UN debts might be more indicative of an
inability to pay based on the dire domestic economic conditions rather than a
failure to pay based on ideological differences with the UN, as was the case with
the former Soviet Union.
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IV. COOPERATION IN THE MAKING: RUSSIA AND THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
The major concern underlying Russian foreign policy in the United Nations
is found in their stated goal of furthering the positive steps undertaken by
Gorbachev's reforms while simultaneously separating Russian policy from the
previous "cold war" communist policy. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman,
Vitaly Churkin stated that Boris Yeltsin is,
Presenting Russia as a new phenomenon in international life. ..fully part of
the democratic world, we would like to build our relations with other
countries belonging to that world as friends and maybe as allies. 117
The continuance of this less ideologically driven approach by the Russian
government has fostered an atmosphere of cooperation in the UN. 118 This in
turn has resulted in many individual nations, including Russia, proposing
increases in the scope and nature of missions that the UN should undertake.
117
Allison Mitchell, "Yeltsin, on Summit's Stage, Stresses His Russian Identity,"
New York Times, 1 February 1992, 5.
118Obviously the changing Russian ideology is not the only factor which has
"fostered cooperation," but it definitely has been a major factor with regard to the
newfound consensus within the Security Council.
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Many of these suggestions have come in the area of conflict management
(prevention, control and termination).
This chapter will examine those conflict management mechanisms in the UN
that are designed to "maintain international peace and security." 119 Specifically,
this chapter will focus on UN peacekeeping, peacemaking and, to a lesser extent,
peacebuilding ventures from the "Russian perspective." 120 I will highlight the
basic differences between these mechanisms and also discuss how they have
evolved. I will also discuss some possible reasons behind the Russian initiatives
to strengthen peacekeeping and peacemaking in the UN.
Increasingly, many sovereign nations are calling upon the UN to fulfill its
envisioned role as the maintainer of "international peace and security." In the
end, this chapter will focus primarily on what that role might entail.
n9The UN's primary purpose, in accordance with Article 1 (1) of the UN
Charter is to "maintain international peace and security." Additionally, Article 24
of the UN Charter gives "the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security."
120The differences between peacekeeping and peacemaking forces are
numerous and varied. The primary difference is that peacekeepers are inserted
after a conflict has taken place and all parties to the dispute have requested their
presence, furthermore, a cease-fire is usually in place when they are inserted.
Peacemakers, on the other hand, are usually an offensive force inserted under the
articles provided in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, hence consent is not required
of the parties to the dispute prior to their insertion (for other differences see
Chapter IV, section C). Peacebuilding initiatives usually do not involve the use
of force.
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B. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS
1. Description
History has witnessed the UN implement a variety of measures to
maintain international peace and security. Some of these actions, or as I refer to
them, conflict management mechanisms, have been founded on principles set
forth in the UN Charter, while others have evolved through the "day-to-day"
activities of the UN. Generally, most of these mechanisms can be placed in one
of three categories based on the means in which they attempt to secure
international peace and security. 121
The first category attempts to secure peace through peaceful means,
either in the form of peaceful settlement of disputes or through cooperation in
resolving international problems which might lead to conflict (i.e. hunger,
poverty, economic decay, environmental degradation, etc.). The UN's mechanism
for peacefully settling disputes is founded on the principles set forth in Chapter
VI of the UN Charter and includes a hierarchy of peaceful settlement
mechanisms. 122 The cooperative approach to peace is more or less founded on
121This is not to be confused with Harold Jacobson's categorization of conflict
management mechanisms based on bureaucratic activity, namely; informational,
normative, rule-creating, rule-supervisory and operational activities. My intent
is to analyze the UN's activity based on broad "approaches to peace" instead of
analyzing bureaucratic activity within separate UN agencies. For a discussion of
Jacobson's bureaucratic activities see; Networks of Interdependence, 149-188.
122This hierarchy of activities as set forth in Article 33 of the UN Charter
includes; negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial
settlement. For an outstanding discussion of these activities see; International
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a "functionalist" theory of conflict management in which states cooperate on
technical initiatives to solve shared international problems, these measures are
usually labeled as "peacebuilding" ventures. 123
The second "approach to peace" (or conflict management mechanism)
seeks to limit an individual state's material ability to engage in confrontational
policies. This usually involves the limitation of arms through disarmament
measures or arms control initiatives. 124 However it can be expanded to include
the limitation of an individual country's "offensive military doctrine." 125 Even
though Article 26 provides for the "establishment of a system for the regulation
of armaments," disarmament initiatives have historically had a limited foundation
Organizations: Principles and Issues, 97-102. For a broad discussion of the
peaceful settlement "approach to peace" see; Swords Into Plowshares, 215-244.
123For a discussion of the functionalist/peacebuilding approach see; Swords
Into Plowshares, 378-406; Networks of Interdependence, 62-66, and Roger A.
Coate and Donald J. Puchala, "Global Policies and the United Nations System: A
Current Assessment," Tournal of Peace Research 27, no. 2, (1990):127-140.
124For an outstanding discussion of disarmament activities in international
organizations see; International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 193-214; and
Swords Into Plowshares, 286-311.
125Russian disarmament proposals in the UN seek not only to decrease the
worlds military arms inventories they also seek to win international acceptance
and compliance of their doctrine of "minimum defensive sufficiency." For
examples of this viewpoint see; "Excerpts From Speeches by Leaders of Permanent
Members of U.N. Council," as delivered by the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin,
and "The Dangers of Nationalism," as delivered by Boris Pankin. For a broad
discussion of "defensive doctrines" as an alternative strategy to peace and their
use in international organizations see; Harry B. Hollins, Averill L. Powers, and
Mark Sommer, The Conquest of War: Alternative Strategies for Global Security
(Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1989), 38-53 and 64-88.
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in the UN's Charter. 126 Most of the initiatives to limit the material ability of
states to war have been established outside the UN either through multilateral or
bilateral treaties.
The final category of conflict management mechanisms that may be
applied by the UN seeks to limit conflict with the threat and/or use of military
force. This can be in an attempt to deter conflict through the threat of force or
to maintain "peace" (or prevent conflict) with the insertion of a peacekeeping force
or as a "last chance" mechanism to mandate peace with the use of a peacemaking
force.
My emphasis for the remainder of this chapter will be with the
evolution of this third category of conflict management mechanisms in the UN,
for it is in this area that Russia has taken the lead and become one the major
proponents of the use of mandated UN forces.
2. Security and Collective Action
In theorv, collective action was to be one of the cornerstones of the UN
organization. Although the UN Charter did not specifically reference the term
"collective security" it did mandate a type of limited collective security
126
It should be noted that this trend toward regulating arms has recently
received a boost in the UN with the emergence of the UN's Arms Trade Register.
For a brief discussion of the Arms Trade Register see; William Epstein, "Write
Down Your Arms," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , March 1992, 11-12, 44.
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system. 127 As stated in Article 1 (1) of the UN Charter, one of the purposes of
the UN was, "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace...." However, as Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN Under
Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, has pointed out, historically the UN
has failed to "provide a system for peace and security," and instead has been used
as a "last resort or safety net." 128
The major problem with a collective security system is its dependence
upon, "identification of a declared common enemy" by a collective group. 129 In the
UN it is up to the Security Council to identify and mandate action against
common enemies or aggressors in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. This mandated action can entail anything from measures not involving
force, such as political or economic sanctions, to the use of military force by the
127Secretary-General Boutros Ghali maintains that the "essence of the concept
of collective security" is contained in the UN Charter, see; An Agenda for Peace,
12. However, Jacobson is probably closer to the truth with his contention that the
UN is a limited collective security system in that it is designed to operate "against
any state other than the five permanent members of the Security Council," see;
Networks of Interdependence, 145.
128My emphasis, Sir Brian Urquhart, "The United Nations: From Peace-keeping
to a Collective System." Adelphi Paper 265, International Institute for Strategic
Studies (1992), 19.
129My emphasis, see; The Conquest of War, 27.
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members of the UN. 130 However, due to the cold war and lack of consensus
in the Security Council (coupled with the presence of a veto), the ideals of
collective security, as set forth in the UN Charter, were never realized. 131
Today, even with the end of the cold war, consensus building, with
regard to collective action, is still a slippery goal. Many smaller nations feel that
frequent use of Chapter VII powers by the Security Council will result in
unnecessary expansion of Security Council power, and eventually result in the
infringement of the "great powers" on the sovereignty of others. For this reason,
the smaller nations on the Security Council have been reluctant to enact those
powers. 132 However, this is not to say that Chapter VII powers won't be used
in the future. Increasingly, many members of the UN have called upon the use
of a more proactive military force to maintain international peace. As an example
of this "great power" sentiment within the Security Council, Russia has
increasingly called for the use of
130
Article 41 sets forth economic and political sanctions, while Article 42 deals
with the use of military force including; "air, sea or land forces," or blockades.
Furthermore, Articles 25 and 48 made these actions binding to all members of the
UN if called upon to act by the Security Council.
131For a brief discussion of this theme see; International Organizations:
Principles and Issues,130-140, and Swords Into Plowshares, 245-285.
132A recent example of this was the Security Council debate over the insertion
of a UN peacekeeping force under the provisions of Chapter VII into Yugoslavia,
see; Paul Lewis, "U. N. Votes to Send Force to Yugoslavia," New York Times, 22
February 1992, 3.
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international forces capable not only of keeping peace—in other words of
being in places where there already is a truce—but forces capable of
establishing or restoring peace. 133
It should also be remembered that the Security Council did enact
certain portions of Chapter VII with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 134 In the end,
it seems that the cold war might have removed some of the impediments to
collective security but it will still be up to the Security Council to identify and
declare a common enemy. 135
It has been argued that the UN has never embarked upon an ideal of
collective security, instead, it has been argued that the UN has been involved in
"selective security," (or collective defense) in other words, action which involves
"security for some at the expense of others." 136 Usually selective security, as a
133My emphasis; Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Vladimir Pasko, Mayak Radio
Network, 1730 GMT, 28 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-104, 29 May 1992, 19).
*
134Although, outside of Articles 39 and 40 it is unclear as to what "proactive"
Articles the Security Council was working from see; Oscar Schachter, "United
Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict," American lournal of International Law, 85 no.
3 (July 1991) 452-473.
135For an outstanding discussion of international organizations and their use
of collective security see; Swords Into Plowshares, 245-285. For a broad
discussion of the merits and faults of collective security in general see; Inis L.
Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962),
94-204.
136
"The Conquest of War," 24-26. Similarly, Inis Claude maintains that the UN
"appears to be committed to a policy of selective nonagression," see; Inis L. Claude
Jr., "Collective Security After the Cold War," in Gary L. Guertner, ed., Collective
Security in Europe and Asia, (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, 2 March 1992), 23-27.
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policy, is much easier to implement because it does not require the consensus of
all members. As the argument goes, selective security could be formulated by a
limited number of members, "sold" to the group and then enacted upon by the
whole body (i.e. Korea or the Gulf War). 137
In general, outside of international organizations, the ease at which
selective security strategies and policy (i.e. unilateral action or actions in the name
of regional alliances) can be enacted, makes it an attractive foreign policy tool.
However, when a country is an active member of an international organization,
like the UN, and continually undertakes policies of selective security it can
eventually alienate itself in that organization. During the cold war this might
have been an acceptable strategy, however, with the advent of the cooperative era
in the UN this strategy might become self defeating or at the very least render the
UN ineffective. In the long run, if nations wish to increasingly cooperate within
the UN they may have to accept some of the inherent problems of collective
security and limit their selective security practices.
3. Preventive Diplomacy
Former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold is usually credited with
the implementation of preventive diplomacy policies within the UN. Historically,
137Some have argued that since the end of the cold war the UN has become
a "vehicle for a superpower like the United States or a coalition-U.S. led-to make
foreign policy decisions," such as was the case in the Gulf War, see; Stephen
Lewis "A Promise Betrayed," interviewed by Jim Wurst, World Policy lournal,
Summer 1991, 539-549.
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preventive diplomacy was established to allow for "United Nations intervention
in an area of conflict outside of, or marginal to, the sphere dominated by cold war
struggles."'™ In other words, preventive diplomacy was a policy used by the
Secretary-General to deal with conflicts separately from the cold war. In the past
preventive diplomacy was synonymous with peacekeeping ventures, however,
preventive diplomacy now seems to be evolving into a more ambitious
activity. 139
The declaration issued by the Security Council summit meeting on 31
January 1992 invited the Secretary-General to report back to the Security Council
with his,
analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more
efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of
the United Nations for preventive diplomacy... . H0
The Secretary-General's reply, entitled "An Agenda for Peace,"
supported this concept of preventive diplomacy and called for
138Swords Into Plowshares, 313.
I.Wt
It is useful to note that the first use of preventive diplomacy was used in
the Congo mission (ONUC) of 1960. Moreover, the significance of recent Russian
cooperation in the area of preventive diplomacy is particularly noteworthy given
their predecessor's (the Soviet government) historical dislike of peacekeeping
ventures (pre-1988).
140My emphasis; "Security Council Summit Declaration: 'New Risks for
Stability and Security'."
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action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing
disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter
when they occur.. ..Preventive diplomacy requires measures to create
confidence; it needs early warning based on information gathering and
informal or formal fact-finding; it may also involve preventive deployment and
in some situations, demilitarized zones. 1*1
Preventive diplomacy is now being defined as detecting and resolving
problems before they lead to armed conflict. Suggestions for increasing
preventive diplomacy usually involve increasing the duties of the Secretary-
General under Article 99. 142 France has proposed that the Security Council
should,
provide the Secretary-General with information on international security and
give him a mandate to enter into regular contact with his counterparts,
leaders of regional organizations.... 143
Similarly, the Russian's have submitted a draft declaration which
establishes guidelines for the improvement of "cooperation between the United
141iMy emphasis; An Agenda for Peace, 5-10. It is interesting to note that
Russian officials have stated that the "Agenda for Peace" was highly influenced
by the "proposals which were put forward by President Boris Yeltsin during his
address at the UN security summit," see; Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by ITAR-
TASS, 0801 GMT, 19 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-183, 21 September 1992, 15).
142
Article 99 enables the Secretary-General to "bring to the attention of the
Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten peace," it would
then be up to the Security Council to act on those "matters."
143
"Excerpts from Speeches by Leaders of Permanent Members of U.N.
Council/'as delivered by the President of France, Francois Mitterrand.
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Nations and regional organizations. 144 The Russian leaders feel identification
would be possible through shared intelligence between regional organizations and
the UN, specifically the Secretary-General. The Russian government has also
proposed the establishment of '"hot lines' to the UN headquarters, and availability
to the General-Secretary of reconnaissance reports, and development of fact-
finding practices.
"
14:> Furthermore, Russia feels this intelligence might be used
in conjunction with preemptive action which would include the use of the
proposed UN Rapid Response forces. 146
Russia has also proposed proactive policies to identify and preempt in
possible conflict areas. Russian officials contend that UN forces should be able
to preempt quickly before hostilities have had a chance to break out. President
Yeltsin maintains that the UN must respond quickly and decisively to dissipate
regional "hot spots," he feels
144Boris Sitnikov, "Russia Presents Plan for Improving UN Cooperation," ITAR-
TASS, 0956 GMT, 20 October 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-203, 20 October 1992, 11-12).
145Andrei Kozyrev, speech delivered to the 47th session of the UN General
Assembly. While many of these Russian proposals seek to expand the power and
influence of the Secretary-General it would appear that Russia still intends to
keep most organizational power regarding security affairs rooted in the Security
Council where they have significant influence and control over agenda items.
146These views were first discussed by Soviet officials who now occupy
important positions in the Russian/UN bureaucracies, namely Boris Pankin and
Vladimir Petrovsky, see; "The Dangers of Nationalism," and "United Nations
Perspective: Preventive Diplomacy," 77-82.
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What is needed is action and persistence....Above all, these forces [UN rapid
response forces] must be brought into action at the right time, that is, not
when blood is already being spilled, but when conflicts are at their nascent
stage....
147
Russian officials feel it is necessary to "fortify the preventive
component in United Nations activity," 148 to include the "use of armed force to
restore peace and, if need be, to punish, the aggressor." 149
In the end, the problem with preventive diplomacy is that the
consensus required to identify potential areas of conflict is much more difficult
than acting against those areas. Furthermore, many of the preventive diplomacy
suggestions require a large amount of regional cooperation which might not be
reasonable to expect if a conflict is imminent. Finally, most nations would agree
that preventive diplomacy is an outstanding policy if you have control over what
is identified as a hostile intention. However, it is a completely different matter
if nations have little to no control over the identification process where they might
possibly be targeted as a belligerent. 150 By and large, the gains from effective
147
Boris Yeltsin, Address to the CSCE Summit 10 July 1992 in Helsinki Finland,
ITAR-TASS, 0945 GMT, 10 July 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-133, 10 July 1992, 2).
148Kozyrev speech to the 47th session of the UN General Assembly.
149Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Yeveniy Menkes, ITAR-TASS, 0110 GMT
28, September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-188, 28 September 1992, 9).
150For Russia, as well as the other permanent members of the Security Council,
this control is guaranteed because of the presence of its veto. That is the primary
reason why the "big five" find it much more palatable to discuss preventive
diplomacy than many of the other UN members.
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preventive diplomacy far out weigh the losses. However, similar to the policy of
collective security, nations must be willing to abrogate some of their autonomy
to the UN and the Secretary-General.
C. PEACEKEEPING & PEACEMAKING
1. Description and Background
Peacemaking finds its roots in the UN Charter. As set forth by Article
24 (1) of the UN Charter, the Security Council is given the "primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security...." Additionally, the
members of the UN are bound by Article 25 which states that member nations
must "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council...."
It is in Chapter VII that one finds the teeth of the UN's peacemaking
responsibilities. Articles 39 and 40 stipulate that the Security Council "shall
determine the existence of any threat to peace...," and take action against those
threats. Articles 41 and 42 specify what types of actions the Security Council may
take, ranging from economic sanctions to armed force. Article 43, although never
enacted, sets forth the provisions for countries to make available forces, assistance,




It should also be noted, the ratification of these agreements
151
Article 43 is generally regarded as the foundation for the establishment of
a standing UN force. Obviously, this Article was never enacted because of the
lack of consensus of the major powers during the cold war. Secretary-General
Boutros Ghali feels that if a UN standing force is to be establish it will require the
Security Council to "bring into being, through negotiations, the special agreements
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(under Article 43) are subject to the "constitutional process" of the member states
hence they are subject to the faults of domestic consensus building (which are
now becoming more apparent in Russia). 152 Articles 45-47 established the
functions of the "Military Staff Committee" (MSC). This military staff was
designed to advise and assist the Security Council on all "questions relating to the
Security Council's military requirements." 133 It should be noted that similar to
Article 43, the MSC exists only on paper.
The remaining articles in Chapter VII set forth requirements for the
"mutual assistance" of all member nations with regard to Security Council
decisions (in other words, mandatory compliance) and stipulate that all members
have an "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense." However, it is
important to note that this right of self-defense shall not, "in any way affect the
foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter," see; An Agenda for Peace, 12-13. For a brief
description of the history of Article 43 and the use of UN forces see; Networks of
Interdependence, 176-186.
1;>2As discussed in Chapter III, the influence of the Russian Parliament is just
now being felt in the formation and application of Russian foreign policy.
Therefore, while the current Yeltsin administration has been able to volunteer
peacekeeping forces to the UN, and has also supported the idea of a standing UN
force, in the future, parliamentary pressure may block such initiatives.
lD3For a brief description of the Security Council's relationship to the MSC, see;
The Procedure of the Security Council, 247-254.
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authority and responsibility of the Security Council.. to maintain or restore
international peace and security." 154
The intention of these articles is to give the UN an offensive military
capability to restore peace collectively in any part of the world with any size force
that the Security Council chooses to employ. Arguably, the only two cases where
UN peacemaking operations have occurred were in Korea in the 1950's and the
recent Gulf War. However, as previously discussed, a case could be made that
in these two instances a UN peacemaking force was not used. Instead, it could
be argued, they were selective operations supported by a limited number of
nations and given symbolic backing by the Security Council. 155
Due to the cold war and lack of international consensus toward "acts
of aggression," the UN was unable to muster sufficient support for peacemaking
and instead turned toward peacekeeping missions to contain conflict.
Interestingly, even though peacekeeping missions are not mandated in the UN
charter they have continued to increased in number and success (albeit on a
1>lAs set forth in Article 51, for a brief discussion of this ideal of self-defense
as it relates to the UN see; "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict," 457-461,
and Eugene V. Rostow, "Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-
Defense," American lournal of International Law, 85, no. 3 (July 1991), 506-516.
1;
"For examples of these arguments as they relate to the Persian Gulf War see;
"Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense,"506-510, and Burns
H. Weston, "Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making:
Precarious Legitimacy," American Journal of International Law, 85, no. 3, (July
1991), 516-535.
72
limited scale). Historically, the use of peacekeeping forces have required a certain
number of preconditions, namely;
• the consent of all parties to the dispute with regard to the establishment and
composition of the force (this usually includes a self-imposed cease-fire prior
to the insertion of troops)
• support and mandating authority from the Security Council (although
historically peacekeeping forces have also been inserted into action by the
Secretary-General)
• a clear mandate for the troops from the UN, specifically the Security Council
• willingness to maintain a non-use of force policy by the peacekeepers except
in the event of self-defense
• willingness of member countries to provide an adequate number of troops
• willingness of member countries (especially permanent members to the
Security Council and "host nations") to provide financial and logistic
support156
Essentially, peacekeeping forces are impartial, primarily nonviolent in
nature and are used as a peaceful interposition group between warring parties.
Whereas, peacemakers are offensive in nature, punitive and are operating against
an identified enemy. 157
1:,6
See; John Q. Blodgett, "The Future of UN Peacekeeping," Washington
Quarterly (Winter 1990): 220. This article is an outstanding review of the recent
attitudes regarding UN peacekeeping.
157This is generally the accepted view of peacemakers, see; The Conquest of
War, 27-33.
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2. Russian Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Proposals
In recent years the topic of a standing UN force structure as received
renewed emphasis. Almost every conceivable type of force structure has been
proposed, from the historical donations of small contingents of national composed
troops to the use of Gurkhas, NATO troops or standing troops varying in size
from 10,000 to 500,000. 158
The Russian government has likewise supported the use of a standing
UN force. President Yeltsin has called for a Security Council mandated, "special
quick-response mechanism to insure peace and stability." 139 This appears to be
quite similar to previous Soviet policy (late 1980's to early 1990's) which called
for the use of a standing UN Rapid Response Force to be used in conjunction
with the MSC. 160 Soviet policy during this time frame also supported;
158tTor a good overall presentation of various force structure proposals see;
"The Future of UN Peacekeeping," 215-219, and James Meacham, "From
Peacekeeping to Peacemaking," International Defense Review, vol. 25 (March
1992), 217-221. For an in depth description of a possible standing UN force see;
John M. Lee, Robert von Pagenhardt and Timothy W. Stanley, Strengthening
United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: A Summary (Washington
D.C.:International Economic Studies Institute, April 1992).
159
"Excerpts From Speeches by Leaders of the Permanent Members of U.N.
Council."
160
"The Rebirth of the U.N.," as delivered by the former Soviet Foreign
Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze to the UN General Assembly on 25 September
1990, (Vital Speeches of the Day, LVII, no. 1, 15 October 1990, 10-11); and "The
Dangers of Nationalism," 6-8.
74
the formation on a mutual basis with other countries of a system of
personnel training for service in the United Nations... [Soviet] logistics
support for the United Nations forces... the training of national military
[USSR military] contingents detailed for possible United Nations use...setting
up an international United Nations training center for personnel to serve in
United Nations troops. 161
Today, Russian peacekeepers have been sent to participate in UN
operations throughout the world, including recent deployments to Yugoslavia and
Iraq.
162 The Russian government has gone out of its way to justify the support
of these types of peacekeeping missions as in the best interest of Russia as a
developing democratic nation. Furthermore, the Yeltsin government has claimed
that prevention of ethnic violence in places like Yugoslavia will go a long way
toward preventing the outbreak of these "nationalist diseases" on the soil of those
republics of the former Soviet Union. As an illustration of this view, Russian
161As suggested by Vladimir Petrovsky in 1990, see; "Towards a
Comprehensive Security Through the Enhancement of the Role of the United
Nations," 242-245. It should be noted that all of these Soviet initiatives have been
fully supported by the current Russian government.
162For Russian activity in Iraq see; Boris Vinogradov, "St. Andrew's Flag in the
Persian Gulf," Izvestiya, 7 October 1992, 4 (FBIS-SOV-92-197, 9 October 1992, 12-
13). For a brief explanation of Russian activity in Yugoslavia see; Suzanne Crow,
"Russia's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 30 (24
July 1992), 31-35; Andrei Kozyrev, "The Side Russia Is on in the Yugoslav
Conflict," Izvestiya, 9 June 1992, 1 and 4 (FBIS-SOV-92-111, 9 June 1992, 18-19);
Vitaly Churkin, interviewed by Petr Orlov and Irina Zaytseva, Moscow Central
Television First Program, 1845 GMT, 1 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-174, 8
September 1992, 16-18); and Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Viktor Levin, Mayak
Radio Network, 1330 GMT, 17 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-182, 18 September
1992, 7-8).
75
Ambassador to the UN, Yulii Vorontsov, regarded the imposition of sanctions on
Yugoslavia as a necessary measure, he felt;
In this situation it would seem expedient not to take exception to the
proposed draft resolution as a whole and to vote for it. Such a position of
ours would signify Russia's unambiguous condemnation of all actions
leading to the incitement of interethnic hatred and conflicts and attempts to
recarve borders and create 'ethnically pure areas,' which would be of great
significance also from the viewpoint of curbing such trends in countries of the
cis: b3
However, the underlying reason for Russian cooperation in UN
peacekeeping ventures, like Yugoslavia, was best expressed by Andrei Kozyrev
when he stated that,
Russia cannot oppose the Security Council. That would jeopardize our own
relations with the West and give rise to suspicions among the state of
Central Europe, to say nothing of our CIS partners, who often draw parallels
between Moscow and Belgrade. ...Support for Serbia, which is gambling on
strong-arm tactics, will be perceived by our neighbors as a danger signal:
that Russia is preparing to follow a similar path. 1<>4
163
Yulii Vorontsov, cable from Russian Ambassador in the United Nation to
President Yeltsin, dated 28 May 1992, published under the heading, "Crime of the
Foreign Ministry: Russians and Serbs, Know the Truth!," Den, no. 23 (7-13 June
1992), 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-076, 22 June 1992, 5).
164Maksim Yusin, "Storm Clouds Gathering Over Belgrade. Andrei Kozyrev's
Visit Was Possibly the Last Chance to Influence Serbia and Prevent International
Sanctions," Izvestiya, 30 May 1992, 6 (FBIS-SOV-92-105, 1 June 1992, 11). This
article is also noteworthy from a domestic point of view in that Kozyrev seemed
to be sending a warning to "national-patriotic" forces within Russian describing
what would happen if they embarked upon a policy of "ethnic-cleansing" using
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As with most of Yeltsin's foreign policy agenda (formulated in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the Russian handling of the Yugoslav conflict has
come under harsh attack from the Russian parliament and Russian "national-
patriotic" forces for its support of UN measures taken against the "fraternal
brotherhood of Slavs" in Yugoslavia. 165 While recent opinion in Russia seems
to support the government's efforts in Yugoslavia, initially the Russian Parliament
felt that the Foreign Ministry acted with "excessive haste" when implementing its
Yugoslav policy in conjunction with the Security Council. 166
The Russian government's coordination of policy with the UN
regarding Yugoslavia represents just another example of the domestic infighting
within Russia. However it should not be inferred from this example that
cooperation with the UN has absolutely zero support with the conservative
"strong-arm tactics" in those nations "near abroad."
163Russian cooperation in the UN regarding the Yugoslav conflict has included;
support for sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, Yugoslav censure from the
UN, support for limited military intervention (regarding the delivery of
humanitarian aid), and logistics support which included the dispatching of a
Russian Airborne Battalion to Yugoslavia. For examples of this support see;
"Russia's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis," 31-35; Colonel A. Oliynik, "Russian
Troops Land in Yugoslavia," Krasnaya Zvezda, 18 April 1992, 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-083,
29 April 1992, 22); and Yevgeniy Menkes, "Russia Co-Authors UN Document,"
ITAR-TASS, 1037 GMT, 12 August 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-156, 12 August 1992, 9).
166Sergei Chugayev, "A. Kozyrev Explains to Parliament Why Russia Joined
in the Sanctions Against Serbia," Izvestiya, 27 June 1992, 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-128, 2 July
1992, 13). For an example of the recent conciliation between the Russian
Parliament and the Yeltsin Administration regarding the Yugoslav conflict see;
Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, "The Main thing Is the Interests of Russia," interviewed
by Aleksy Burmistenko, Trud, 3 September 1992, 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-116, 11
September 1992, 29-30).
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elements within the Russian government. First, Russian deployment of military
forces to Yugoslavia (as well as Iran) obviously had the sanction of the Russian
military, as it gives them another mission, hence another reason for being.
Secondly and more important, even conservative Russian officials have stated that
"Russian troops would be trained as peacekeeping forces over the next few years
for possible deployment with UN peacekeeping forces." 167 Andrei Kozyrev's
support for the creation of United Nations "rapid reaction units, consisting of
special subunits from different countries, raised on a contractual basis, including
forces of the permanent members of the Security Council" was also received with
favor by conservative forces. 168
This, however, is not to suggest that all UN peacekeeping initiatives
will receive one hundred percent acceptance in the Russian federation. Nor
should it be construed that these peacekeeping initiatives are being forwarded
solely because their humanitarian implications. Many observers have viewed
Russia's peacekeeping ventures within the CIS as a sign that Russia is not
completely committed to impartial peacekeeping ventures and only supports such
impartial ventures to add legitimacy to their own peacekeeping initiatives within
167Paraphrasing of comments made by Russian Defense Minister Pavel
Grachev, see; Stephen Foye and Alfred A. Reisch, "Military and Security Notes,"
RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 31 (31 July 1992), 59-60.
168Andrei Kozyrev, personal letter to United Nations Secretary-General Boutros
Ghali dated 21 February 1992, Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, no. 6, 31 March 1992, 8-10
(FBIS-USR-92-005-L, 12 June 1992, 7-8).
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the CIS. This could be illustrated by the fact that some Russian officials have
voiced direct opposition to UN peacekeeping involvement in those areas "near
abroad" the Russian federation. 169 It has also been pointed out that Russian
armed forces might be "excessively politicized" and therefore unable to carry out
impartial peacekeeping duties in CIS mandated operations. It is however,
questionable whether this factor will negatively impact their ability to support UN
mandated operations. 170
Probably the most serious allegation leveled against the Russian
government with regard to its peacekeeping initiatives (within the CIS
framework) is that they are merely camouflaged attempts at reimposing Russian
influence over the weaker republics of the former Soviet Union. 171 Most Russian
officials have attempted to allay these fears by pointing out that these
peacekeeping ventures in the CIS are conducted multilaterally with the consent
and support of the UN. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry contends that these
169Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, Marshal Evgenii
Shaposhnikov has gone on record as supporting limited UN involvement in those
ongoing conflicts in the republics of the former Soviet Union. However he is
"categorically opposed" to UN peacekeeping forces becoming involved in those
areas, see; Suzanne Crow, "Russian Peacekeeping: Defense, Diplomacy, or
Imperialism?," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 37 (18 September 1992), 37. On the
other hand, it should be noted that some Russian officials, most importantly Boris
Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev, have shown a remarkable willingness to incorporate
the UN into CIS peacekeeping ventures.
170Suzanne Crow, "The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former
USSR," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 37 (18 September 1992), 34-35.
171
See; "Russian Peacekeeping: Defense, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?," and "The
Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former USSR."
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operations are only being undertaken because the former regime of the Soviet
Union covered up and suppressed regional "time bombs" (i.e. the Dniester region,
Nagorno Karabakh and the Ossetia region) which the Russian federation is now
being forced to handle. 172 Additionally, some Russian officials contend that
these peacekeeping missions are not unusual in international affairs since they are
conducted within the "entire geo-political space of the former Union" and
therefore, should be considered within Russia's "sphere of vital interests" similar
to the "US Monroe Doctrine in Latin America." 173
In the short run it is certainly arguable as to the motives of the Russian
government regarding those peacekeeping initiatives in the CIS. However, on the
whole, Russian initiatives in the UN seem to be in keeping with those of the other
major powers and only indirectly related to Russia's regional peacekeeping
commitments. In other words, the Russian initiatives, within the UN, are all
aimed at increasing the frequency and scope of peacekeeping and peacemaking
missions with the hopes of making the UN a more proactive conflict management
tool for the "great powers."
172Andrei Kozyrev, "Andrei Kozyrev: The Minefield is So Great," interviewed
bv Yelizaveta Pavlova, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 1st ed., 25 July 1992, 7 (FBIS-SOV-92-
144, 27 July 1992, 11-12).
173This is the contention of Evgenii Ambartsumov in "Russian Peacekeeping:
Defense, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?," 38-39.
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3. Sovereignty and Intervention
Historically, the topic of sovereignty has fueled numerous debates
within the UN. On most occasions, when a government failed to agree with a
UN decision it would state that the UN decision infringed upon the state's
inherent right of sovereignty. 174 The supposed justification for this is found in
the UN Charter, Article 2 (7) which states, "Nothing in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state...." Recently, this theory was espoused in
the Security Council summit meeting on 31 January 1992 when the Prime Minister
of China, Li Peng, stated;
In essence, the issue of human rights falls within the sovereignty of each
country. ...It is neither appropriate nor workable to demand that all countries
measure up to the human rights criteria or models of one or a small number
of countries. ...[China] is opposed to interference in the internal affairs of
other countries using the human rights issue as an excuse. 175
174As was shown in Chapter II, this was definitely true of the Soviet Union
during the "confrontational period" in the UN. The "non-intervention clause" of
the UN Charter was used to justify Soviet and the Eastern Bloc actions when
dealing with topics such as Polish statehood, Soviet troop withdrawal from Iran,
the Hungarian revolt (1956), the Czech uprising (1968) and alleged human rights
abuses in the USSR.
175
"Excerpts From Speeches by Leaders of Permanent Members of U.N.
Council," New York Times, 1 February 1992, 5.
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Nevertheless, the Security Council has always had the right to force a
decision upon a member state, irrespective of the notion of sovereignty. As
Article 2 (7) further stated, "this principle [sovereignty] shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." However, most
members of the Security Council have been reluctant to intervene with an armed
UN force under the guidance of Chapter VII. Historically this was due to the
confrontational attitudes of the major belligerents in the cold war who lacked
consensus in the Security Council. Recently, however, the Security Council has
been reluctant to act because of a fear that this would set a precedent for the
future use of UN force in one's own "domestic affairs.
"
17('
Of all the nations in the UN, the Russian stance regarding the
protection of human rights and sovereignty has probably witnessed the most
startling changes. A one time champion of non-intervention the Russian
government now maintains that
The principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of countries may not
be used as a "safe conduct" for the violation of human rights. In our
opinion, the Security Council has the right to use its authority should
extraordinary humanitarian situations arise. 177
176This fear is obviously much more prevalent in those nations which lack the
power of the veto in the Security Council. For an example of this viewpoint see;
"United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict," 468.
177Kozyrev letter to Ghali dated 21 February 1992.
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The Russians are quick to point out, however, that their vision of
human rights protection varies greatly from the traditional views of their Soviet
predecessors. Russian officials remind us, regarding the subject of human rights,
that
Before, it was primarily the victims of totalitarian regimes and ideologies
which had to be protected. Today, more and more often a response has to
be given to aggressive nationalism, which is threatening to become a new
global danger. 178
Specifically Russia is demanding that the UN must now protect the
human rights of "national minorities, those of the Russian and Russian-speaking
population in the Baltics and in other former union republics, in particular." 179
Recently, Russian officials have stressed that the protection of minority rights is
the number one priority of the Russian delegation in the UN. It is important that
the Western nations keep this in mind when they analyze future Russian
178Kozyrev's speech to the 47th session the UN General Assembly.
179Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Yevgeniy Menkes, 20 September 1992.
Some have argued that this Russian view is merely an excuse the current
government is using so that it can justify a renewed policy of imperialism in the
republics of the former Soviet Union. However, it can also be convincingly
argued that the "virus of nationalism" is not limited to the former Soviet Union,
and that the protection of minority rights is a legitimate concern of the
international community, especially regarding Russian complaints in the Baltic
republics. For examples of this nationalism in the "Baltics," see; Celestine Bohlen,
"Estonia Rattles Its Russian Residents With Its Insistence on 'Estonization'," New
York Times, 10 August 1992, A6.
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peacekeeping and peacemaking proposals. Although there are many threats that
the UN may be called upon to deal with, for the Russian Federation the "main
threat is, of course, aggressive nationalism." 180
Even though Russia continues to emphasize bold proactive initiatives
which seek to minimize minority rights violations by intervening into the
domestic affairs of sovereign nations it should be remembered that Russian still
maintains a veto in the Security Council and can therefore, still exercise its ability
to protect its own domestic jurisdiction. In other words, most Russian officials
would agree with the statement put forward by Eduard Shevardnadze in January
of 1991 when he stated that
the most important thing is to preserve the type of order in which all
decisions related to upholding international security are made by the UN
Security Council, in which we have, a veto right.... 181
Consequently, it appears that question of infringement upon domestic
sovereignty is of vital interest to small and large nations alike, although for
completely different reasons. Even though China can in no way be called a small
180Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Victor Levin, Mayak Radio Network, 0630
GMT, 18 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-183, 18 September 1992, 8).
181iMy emphasis, quoted in; Russia's Continuation of the Soviet Security
Council Membership, 13. Given the recent Russian initiatives that seek to increase
the power of the Secretary-General it is important to note that most Russian
officials still deem the Security Council to be the primary UN organ from which
UN mandated security ventures should be controlled.
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nation, it best represents that mentality with its view that "peace-keeping
operations should be conducted in compliance with the principles of non-
interference in internal affairs," and they should not be conducted using the
"human rights issue as and excuse." 182 In other words, many small nations fear
that they will be unable to protect themselves from "superpower" hegemony in
the Security Council. 183 On the other hand some observers feel that the large
nations, specifically the permanent members of the Security Council, must be
willing to curtail some of their national sovereignty, in the UN, for the general
good of the international community. 184
This may be especially problematic for Russia with the emergence of
a legitimate parliament and vocal public opposition to governmental policies. In
the past, Soviet or Russian heads of state have been able to dictate foreign and
domestic policy without being "checked" by the legislature or parliament (i.e.
Supreme Soviet or Congress of Peoples Deputies). However, increasingly the
Russian parliament has been searching for an expanded role in the government
182For examples of these views see; Hu Yumin, "UN's Role in a New World
Order," Beijing Review, (10 June 1991): 12-14; and "Excerpts from Speeches by
leaders of Permanent Members of U.N. Council."
183China with its veto obviously would have some protection in the Security
Council, however, the remaining nations of the former "non-aligned" movement
still fear "great power" hegemony in the UN, specifically in the Security Council.
184This is the view of Sir Brian Urquhart in; "The Future of UN Peacekeeping,"
213.
85
including in the area of foreign policy formation and implementation. 180
Furthermore, it is unclear as to whether President Yeltsin will even be able to
rally public support for increased participation in the UN. 186
The ever present question for the Security Council (and the Russian
government) is to determine exactly where the domestic sovereignty of a nation
ends and international responsibility and jurisdiction begins. It seems that if
nations desire to increase UN jurisdiction and settle global disputes with a UN
mandated force, they might also find themselves being called upon to surrender
some of their authority (unilateral action) to the Security Council. Therefore, if
Russia truly intends to increase its "collective" efforts in the UN as a foundation
of its foreign policy it must decide how far it is willing to infringe upon the
sovereignty of another nation, and more importantly how much sovereignty it
185This newfound parliamentarian influence over Russia's foreign policy (and
UN policy) was most recently displayed when two members of the Parliament,
Yeigeniy Ambartsumov and Oleg Rumyantsev visited the former Yugoslav
Republic to gain "objective and general information" regarding Russian
involvement in the crisis and to "overcome the one-sided position which the
international community has adopted in the Yugoslav conflict." These members
were then to report back to the Supreme Soviet with their findings. It should be
mentioned that this trip was sanctioned by President Yeltsin, see; Yuriy Malinov,
"Reviews Policy Mistakes on FRY," ITAR-TASS, 2030 GMT, 10 August 1992 (FBIS-
SOV-92-155, 11 August 1992, 10-11). Yevgeniy Ambartsumov's inclusion as a
Russian delegate to the London Conference regarding the Yugoslav conflict is
another such example of this growing influence that the Russian Parliament has
in foreign affairs. For a brief review of this influence see; "The Main Thing is the
Interests of Russia."
186For an example of Russian public sentiment in opposition to increased UN
actions see; Celestine Bohlen, "Russian Nationalists Protest Vote Against Serbia,"
New York Times, 8 June 1992, A6.
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(the Russian President, Parliament and public) is willing to surrender to the UN
through collective action agreements.
4. Missions
Overall, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions can generally fall into
one of three categories; conflict prevention, conflict control and police action.
Conflict prevention entails, general intelligence gathering, targeting prospective
risk areas, conflict policy formation and conflict policy implementation normally
through the use of some mandated force. The UN is currently ill prepared to
conduct most of the general intelligence gathering functions without the voluntary
aid of its member states. Although the Russians have suggested the
establishment of a Military Risk Reduction Center, it is not clear if this is to serve
as a complete UN intelligence gathering center or just a type of world wide
NORAD system to complement their global anti-missile shield proposals.
Historically, the UN has been fairly capable of targeting prospective
conflict areas, however, it has been ill suited to formulate and implement
successful policy prior to the outbreak of hostilities (i.e. preventive diplomacy
ventures). One conflict prevention proposal (or preventive diplomacy proposal)
calls for the positioning of UN forces in nations bordering possible conflict
areas.
187
This proposal assumes that UN forces within striking distance will
deter aggression. In order for this threat to be truly credible it seems the UN
187/One of the primary advocates of this proposal is Vladimir Petrovsky, see his
work entitled, "United Nations Perspective: Preventive Diplomacy," 77-82.
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forces would have to be sizeable and interdict automatically like a "trip-wire"
force. 188 In other words, for this force to be truly effective it must have credible
capabilities and intentions. Furthermore, this force must be backed up by a
credible reserve force in the event that it is overrun, especially given the fact that
the "trip-wire" force is likely to be of limited size. In the end, if the UN hopes to
avert hostilities it will have to do what many individual countries are incapable
of doing, that is recognize a possible conflict situation and act upon it prior to its
"nascent stage."
Currently, the UN seems to be quite capable of handling conflicts once
they appear. Its reputation as an impressive peacekeeping force is well
earned. 184 However, the UN may increasingly be called upon to respond to new
threats including illicit drug proliferation, terrorism, environmental control and
188/Claude's opposition to automatic responses is noteworthy but seems to be
steeped in "cold war" ideology, see; Swords Into Plowshares, 277-282. Brian
Urquhart has become one of the major proponents of automatic responses, see;
"The United Nations: From Peace-keeping to a Collective System," 23-24. It
should be noted that President Yeltsin, while favoring preventive action, feels
those measures should only be undertaken "upon a decision of the Security
Council," see; "Excerpts from Speeches by Leaders Permanent Members of U.N.
Council."
189Even in spite of recent setbacks in the Yugoslav conflict, the UN's
peacekeeping ventures have significantly increased in scope, nature and success
since 1988, see; An Agenda For Peace, 14-16, and United Nations,
Communications and Project Management Division Department of Public
Information, United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations Information Notes, 17
January 1992. It should also be mentioned that currently, the United Nations is
one of very few international organizations that can boast of any peacekeeping
missions, successful or otherwise.
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even disarmament control. 190 All of these new threats could be placed under
the heading of "police actions," which means that the UN might be called upon
to become the world's "policeman" with real policing responsibilities. This UN
police force could become the DEA, FBI, EPA all rolled into one. Furthermore,
it could be called upon to enforce previously agreed upon arms control accords
or mandatory disarmament resolutions mandated in the Security Council. In
other words, contrary to traditional thought, the UN may be called upon to act
collectively as an instrument that "provides enforcement mechanisms for the
whole body of international law." 191
This is not to suggest that these new missions will in any way replace
in importance the traditional mission of peacekeeping and possible peacemaking
in the near future. Peacekeeping missions will continue to be the UN's "bread
and butter" role in the area of conflict management. As a matter of fact the
growing impact of the last three major UN operations (Cambodian peacekeeping
190The expansion of the UN to include these missions has also been supported
by the Russian government, see; Kozyrev's letter to Secretary-General Boutros
Ghali dated 21 February 1992.
191
Inis Claude maintains that collective security "is a specialized instrument of
international policy in the sense that it is intended only to forestall the arbitrary
and aggressive use of force, not to provide enforcement mechanisms for the
whole body of international law." The recent activities of the United Nations in
the Iraq-Kuwait conflict might suggest otherwise. For a discussion of traditional
collective actions and its relationship to the maintenance of international law see;
Swords Into Plowshares, 249-250. However, to be fair to Claude, he maintains
that the UN activity in the Gulf War was a "special case" and was not an example
of collective security but instead an example of "collective enforcement," see;
"Collective Security After the Cold War."
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mission, the Yugoslav peacekeeping mission and the Persian Gulf peacemaking
mission) have led many observers to believe that the UN may in fact fulfill its
envisioned role as the maintainer of "international peace and security."
5. The Future of UN Peacekeeping
Before one begins to overstate the importance of the UN with regards
to conflict management it should be emphasized that even the most ambitious UN
peacekeeping initiatives do not equate to conflict resolution. In fact it has been
argued that peacekeeping missions merely prolong a struggle because once
peacekeepers are in place the warring factions no longer have a motivation to
settle the dispute. The example of the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus,
where UN peacekeepers have been in place since 1964 without a resolution to the
conflict, has been offered as an illustration of this point. 192
Additionally, while the peacemaking method of conflict management
does go further toward resolving a conflict it to is also fraught with problems.
In order for peacemaking forces to be truly effective they should be inserted into
a conflict with a political mandate from the Security Council which would set the
terms of the conflict resolution plan. Furthermore, these forces should have the
"muscle" to force compliance with UN resolutions. However, as mentioned
earlier, the consensus required for the insertion of peacemaking forces is often
192George L. Sherry, "The United Nations, International Conflict, and American
Security," Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 5 (1986), 762-764. Today, many
observers are using the "quagmire" in Yugoslavia as a further illustration of this
point.
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difficult to attain (much more so than that of a peacekeeping mission). Even
though peacemaking missions have a much greater possibility of success (that is
the avoidance of impasse management), they are politically more difficult to
mandate than peacekeeping missions. For this reason, it appears that if
peacemaking forces are to be used in the future one could expect them to be
primarily relegated to the role of forcibly entering a conflict area, securing the
peace militarily, and then taking up the business of a peacekeeping mission
without a political resolution mandate from the Security Council.
In the era of cooperation and Security Council consensus, UN forces
may be called upon to fulfill new and more complex missions. Although many
consider the potential of the UN to be enormous, it remains to be seen if nations
will be willing to increase the responsibility of the UN, at the expense of national
sovereignty.
D. CONCLUSIONS
What does the Russian Federation gain from cooperating with the West and
increasing the scope of UN security activities? 193 First, UN security forces
would provide a valuable means of stemming the "virus of nationalism," that
193For an outstanding discussion of some of the benefits of Russian cooperation
in peacekeeping ventures see; "Russian Peacekeeping: Defense, Diplomacy, or
Imperialism?," 39-40.
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often crosses international borders. 144 Russia appears to be one of the leading
advocates for protecting the rights of minorities within newly emerging nations
(i.e. Yugoslavia, the republics of the former Soviet Union). Through cooperation
with the West in the United Nations, the Russian government might be able to
garner international support for containing the evils of "ethnic cleansing" which
would significantly bolster its policy regarding human rights violations of
Russian-speaking minorities in the CIS.
Secondly, these Russian proposals supporting the use of UN security forces
(which they can partially control in the Security Council) could be an attempt to
overcome their current inability to influence or control regional security forces (i.e.
NATO, WEU, etc.) Boris Pankin recently stated that,
activities of newly established as well as restructured international
organizations should be integrated [in the UN] in order to add stability to
the pillars of comprehensive security. In this context, the role and
responsibility of the United Nations are rapidly increasing as it turns into the
main security organization in the world} 95
It is not hard to see that Russia will definitely gain international power and
influence if the UN indeed becomes "the main security organization in the world,"
194-
This was one of the major if not primary concerns that both Boris Pankin
and Andrei Kozyrev described to the to the UN General Assembly, see; "The
Dangers of Nationalism," 7, and Andrei Kozyrev's speech delivered to the 47th
session of the UN General Assembly.
195With original emphasis; "The Dangers of Nationalism," 7.
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if for no other reason than they are one of only five permanent members in the
Security Council and therefore, have the use of a veto as well as a significant
amount of control over the Security Council's agenda.
Thirdly, Russian cooperation in these new security ventures bolsters Russian
prestige and influence in the international arena. Recently, Boris Yeltsin has
supported this notion that cooperation in these security matters would "strengthen
Russia's international prestige." 196 Some have also suggested that through
cooperation in UN security ventures, the Yeltsin government may also garner
domestic prestige by winning a number of "small victorious wars," namely in
Yugoslavia, Libya and Iraq. 197
Finally, many have suggested that Russian cooperation in security matters
will ensure that they receive "quid pro quo" treatment in the Security Council. 198
One area in which cooperation might garner reciprocal support is in the
previously mentioned case of human rights violations of Russian-speaking
minorities. Given Russia's economic hardships, this "quid pro quo" treatment
1%
See; "Russian Peacekeeping: Defense, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?," 40.
197The notion of "small victorious wars," has its roots in early 20th century
Russian politics. For a discussion of this topic see; Vladimir Kulistikov, "Boris
Yeltsin Looks Abroad for Army Action To So Avert Misbehavior Back Home,"
New Times, no. 30 (July 1992), 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-161, 19 August 1992, 24-25).
198Ambassador Chan Heng Chee, "The UN: From Peace-keeping to Peace-
making," Adelphi Paper 265, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992, 33.
For a general discussion of the merits of quid pro quo negotiation in international
organizations see; Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during
the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security, 16, no. 4 (Spring 1992), 143-
178.
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might also be rendered in an area of financial assistance which Russia could
desperately use. 199 Certainly, a renewed confrontational attitude would make
any "quid pro quo" arrangement a highly unlikely occurrence and given recent
Russian sentiment, Western assistance is still highly desired .200
What ever the reasons, Russia seems to be looking toward the UN to fulfill
some of its security concerns. The larger question remaining is will the rest of the
world "follow suit." With the end of the cold war, the UN's chore of "maintaining
international peace and security" will become increasingly complex. As member
nations question the use of peacekeeping and/ or peacemaking forces, they will
have to concurrently question traditional notions of sovereignty. If nations desire
an expansion of the UN's security envelope, including an expansion of the
preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking functions, they will have
to find a new balance between collective action and national sovereignty.
199This financial assistance would probably not come directly from Security
Council mandates but would instead be received from individual members (i.e.
the United States) in exchange for Russian support of Western initiatives in the
Security Council.
200
It should be mentioned that in the long run Russian "national-patriots,"
seeking control of the government, might receive a higher utility from arousing
age old confrontational attitudes in the public arena with their traditional enemies
(i.e. the U.S.) than they would through cooperation with the West. However, in
the near term this still appears to be a highly unlikely eventuality.
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V. CONCLUSIONS: IS RUSSIAN COOPERATION A PLAUSIBLE POLICY
WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS?
There can be no doubt that prior to the mid-1980's the Soviet Union's
security policy within the United Nations was confrontational in both nature and
in practice. A study of the voting record within the Security Council clearly
demonstrates that the Soviet Union's first priority regarding security was to
ensure that the UN did not intervene into the "domestic jurisdiction" of the Soviet
state. Furthermore, Soviet declaratory policy and participation within the UN
further supports the notion that the Soviet government was set upon a course of
confrontation within the UN. Numerous Soviet activities within the UN clearly
demonstrate their confrontational nature, namely; their lack of support for UN
peacekeeping missions, their "troika" proposal for reorganization of the office of
the Secretary-General, their undermining of the Secretariat by means of a
"secondment policy" of appointment and their failure to logistically and
financially support the United Nations.
The confrontational attitude of the Soviet Union was not without cause.
This policy, while in complete agreement with ideological nature of competition
between capitalism and communism, was founded on the realities of the cold
war. Andrei Kozyrev contends that "the Soviet Union was essentially in
confrontation with the U.N., since totalitarianism is incompatible with the U.N.
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ideals."201 There were, however, strategic implications for this policy namely,
Soviet confrontation in the UN provided another means of limiting the ability of
the Western nations to undermine the power, position and authority of the Soviet
government in the international arena. This strategic aspect of the Soviet policy
was clearly displayed every time the Soviets held up the shield of non-
interference, found in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, to protect it from Western
intervention. This was especially true during the early years of the UN and
receded, as the Western majority, and hence domination, decreased in the UN.
During this later period the Soviets continually used a confrontational policy to
antagonize the West and block them from their supposed "imperialist" tendencies
while simultaneously appearing to be the guardian of the non-aligned movement.
As the Soviets' internal problems grew and became increasingly
unmanageable (late 1980's) the Soviet government began to look upon the UN,
not as a tool for blocking the West, but as a means of increasing Soviet "breathing
space" in the international arena so that they might better focus on domestic
problems. By the early-1990's, the Soviets began to use the UN as a means of
assisting themselves in the maintenance of their security, albeit in a limited sense.
This is most drastically illustrated by their complete reversal regarding the
support for UN peacekeeping missions.
201Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Vyacheslav Terekhov, Interfax, 1542 GMT,
16 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-181, 17 September 1992, 11).
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By the beginning of 1992, the Russian Federation had secured the previously
held Soviet seat in the UN and more importantly in the Security Council. Since
that time, the Russians have continued, much like their predecessors the Soviets,
to look toward the UN as a means of enhancing their security in the international
arena. While the Soviets did this through confrontation and later through the use
of cooperative ventures in hopes of favorable "quid pro quo" treatment, the
Russian's first and foremost used the UN to legitimize their newfound position
in the "new world order."
Russian leaders, Yeltsin included, have continually pointed to their position
in the Security Council as proof that they are a legitimate "great power" in the
new international arena. Whether or not this is true is arguable, but certainly the
ease and speed at which "great power" status was conferred upon them by the
remaining permanent members in the Security Council surely help to legitimize
the Russian government's international and to a lesser extent domestic position.
What might be the reasons for Russia selecting either a confrontational or
cooperative policy within the UN and what path should we expect? This is
clearly one of the most important issues of this thesis. By analyzing the Russian
government's declaratory policy coupled with their current activity within the
UN, one is left to believe that Russian will indeed continue to pursue a
cooperative policy within the United Nations. Furthermore, most evidence
suggests that Russia may embark upon a strategy of cooperation for many of the
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same reasons that the former Soviet Union altered its philosophy regarding the
UN.
First, it is Kozyrev's, as well as many other leading Russian officials
(including Yeltsin's), contention that Russia will be "able to realize [its] interests
far more effectively through cooperation within the United Nations," than through
the reemergence of traditional "ideological battles" with the West.202 In other
words, the current Russian administration believes that Russian "national
interests" will be well served by the use of cooperative policies within the UN.
One such example of this attitude is the increasing emphasis that Russia has
placed on the importance of strengthening UN preventive diplomacy,
peacekeeping and even peacemaking ventures. Many Russian officials feel that
increasing the roles of UN preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping will give the
Russian government a means of dissipating conflict without the heavy price of
intervention, which may become critical in the increasingly hostile regions of
Central Eurasia and East Europe.
There can be no argument with the fact that Russia is certainly inclined
toward "curing the virus of nationalism" which they feel is the cause of many of
these conflicts. Additionally, one must also remember that because of its




Eurasia problems than it would be for the U.S.203 Furthermore, with its limited
resources, Russia might be forced to look toward the UN for help. Underlying
the Russian search for an effective policy within the UN is a belief that
international organizations will, in the future, be of benefit in establishing peace.
Many Russian officials agree with Andrei Kozyrev's statement that
For 73 years, we were in a state of confrontation with the whole world and
nothing good came of this for our people.... The line of setting Russia up
against the rest of the world under the pretext of defending its
independence is a betrayal of her national interests. It is far better to defend
one's state interests through cooperation with other countries, and not
through setting oneself up against them. Otherwise one should not go to
the UN, but to the battlefield.204
Secondly, many Russian officials feel that the UN presents Russia with a
legitimate international vehicle for establishing Russian influence in the world
arena. This is especially important given Russia's powerful position in the
Security Council combined with its lack of a similarly powerful position in many
other significant regional or international organizations (i.e. GATT, EC, WEU,
203Lawrence Freedman makes this point with respect to the governments of
West Europe, however, I feel it is just as appropriate with regard to Russia. See;
Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," Foreign Affairs, 71,
no. 1 (America and the World 1991/92): 37.
204Andrei Kozyrev as reported by Yevgeniy Menkes, ITAR-TASS, 0110 GMT,
28 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-188, 28 September 1992, 9).
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CSCE, etc). 203 Furthermore, Russia's shrinking military and economic presence
abroad means that it must turn to political or diplomatic presence if it hopes to
influence international actions. If for no other reason, Russia's interaction with
the UN, specifically the Security Council, will in part legitimize its position as a
world power. In the words of a Russian official, "we [Russia] have inherited the
Soviet Union's seat on the Security Council—that demonstrates our role as a great
power."206 Similarly, it is not hard to see that an emerging policy of
confrontation or at the very least isolation would leave Russia without a say in
the UN which it deems as an increasingly effective tool in the international arena.
Andrei Kozyrev contends that Russia
was reduced to catastrophe by decades of isolation and confrontation with
the world around. A return to that policy would revive the suspicion, the
arms race, and the clamorous UN initiatives void of any real substance.207
205
It should be mentioned that this Russian hope that the UN will become the
world's "main security organization" would also give the other permanent
members of the Security Council similar power.
206Statement made by Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev; "Kozyrev on
'Geopolitics' in Foreign Policy."
207
Vitalii Ganyushkin and Yevgenii Rusakov, "How Can you Say This in
Russian. Russia Takes Seat in United Nations With Right to Deciding Vote.
United Nations is Becoming Real Headquarters of World Politics in Our
Turbulent Times Instead of Club for Ideological Struggle," Novoye Vremya no. 41,
October 1992, 18-22 (FBIS-Sov-92-200, 15 October 1992, 11).
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In the end, with an increasing number of regional security organizations,
Russia would certainly benefit if the UN became the premier security organization
in the world.
Thirdly, similar to the Soviet Union, Russian cooperative policies in the UN
will open the doors to other international organizations (IMF, GATT, etc.) much
faster than confrontational policies. Furthermore, Russia could certainly gain
from the economic, environmental, health, and technical assistance that the UN's
special agencies can provide. Russian officials have continued to remind the West
that
we [Russia] do not have the possibility of regenerating our own economy
without cooperation, without entering the world community. In a word, the
pragmatic concern about our own interests requires an active global foreign
policy, but realizing our interest by means of cooperation and not by means
of confrontation.208
This statement suggests that not only does the Russian Federation need the
help of the West but they also cannot afford to become enmeshed in another
confrontational cold war. Therefore, the Russian government is currently much
more predisposed toward cooperative "give and take" attitude in the Security
Council which Russia maintains will increase the likelihood of reciprocal support
from the West in the UN.
208Andrei Kozyrev, interviewed by Yevgenii Menkes, ITAR-TASS, 0220 GMT,
29 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-189, 29 September 1992, 7).
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Finally, Russia seems to be much more concerned with domestic reform than
it does with an adventurous foreign policy. Currently, popular opinion maintains
that Yeltsin has his hands full with growing public and political discontent over
his domestic economic reforms and hence it would be politically and
economically infeasible for him to undertake an aggressive confrontational foreign
policy.
This is not to suggest that a Russia cooperative policy in the UN is a
foregone conclusion. There are many possible impediments to Russian-UN
cooperation but without out a doubt the largest and most serious involves the
current domestic political battle raging between liberal and conservative elements
within the Russian government. Although the current administration (Yeltsin,
Kozyrev, Vorontsov, etc.) seems to support cooperative UN policies, a more
hardline government may deem it in Russia's best interest to turn away from the
UN because of its ties to the "imperialist world." A conservative government
made up of radical "national-patriots" (influenced by the conservative Parliament)
may blame the West (and agencies like the UN) for the country's current ills and
take Russia back to the confrontational policies of the former Soviet Union.
Similarly, if the current Russian government comes to odds with the UN
over "accepted norms of international practice" it might find itself on the receiving
end of undesirable UN policy mandates.209 If this is the case, the Russian
209Armed with the veto in the Security Council, Russia would be able to
effectively block these UN mandates, however, Russia would find itself in
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government may very well abandon its cooperative UN strategy and attempt to
blunt international influence through confrontation and possibly military might.
However, this extreme Russian conservative agenda regarding the UN still
appears to be very unlikely. What is more likely is a measured retreat from the
current administration's reliance upon international organizations as a primary
vehicle for international policy implementation. Instead it appears that Russia
might take a more centrist approach, which emphasizes Russian activity in
domestic and "near abroad" policy utilizing a more unilateral approach. 210
position similar to that of the Soviets in the early years of the UN. Russian
unilateral intervention in a republic of the former Soviet Union stands as just one
of many possible violations of "accepted norms of international behavior" that the
government may embark upon. Currently, the Baltic Republics and Russia are
arguing their respective views of this situation in the UN, see; Aleksandr Shalnev,
"A. Kozyrev Criticizes Human Rights Violations in Estonia and Latvia From the
UN Rostrum," Izvestiya, 24 September 1992, 4 (FBIS-SOV-92-190, 30 September
1992, 16-17); and Anatolijs Gorbunovs, Latvian Supreme Council Chairman's
speech delivered to the 47th UN General Assembly in New York on 25 September
1992, Radio Riga Netzvork, 1044 GMT, 25 September 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-189, 29
September 1992, 56-57).
210The Foreign and Defense Policy Council, a Russian organization made up
of liberal and centrists foreign policy experts and politicians, produced a report
which could very possibly signal the form that this new Russian foreign policy
may take, see; Foreign and Defense Policy Council, "Strategy for Russia"
published under the heading "Some Theses for the Report of the Foreign and
Defense Policy Council," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 August 1992, 4-5 (FBIS-USR-92-
115, 8 September 1992, 54-64). For a discussion of this policy and the make up
of the council see; Vitalitii Tretyakov, "Between Ideals and Reality. Notes in
Connection With the Publication of the 'Strategy for Russia' Theses," Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, 19 August 1992, 4 (FBIS-USR-92-115, 8 September 1992, 52-54); Sergei
Karaganov, "It Should Not Just Be the Government That Looks for Sensible
Solutions," interviewed by Georgii Ivanov-Smolenskii, Izvestiya, 25 June 1992, 2
(FBIS-SOV-92-133, 10 July 1992, 21-25); and "From the NG File," Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, 19 August 1992, 4 (FBIS-USR-92-115, 8 September 1992, 64).
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While it is certainly true, in the near term, that Russia can't afford to return
to the "Mr Nyet policies" of the Soviet era, they may increasingly seek a path
separate from the UN in which they emphasize unilateral action to forward an
emerging Russian "mission." It is important to note that this movement toward
a more independent policy within the UN will not be directly based on the
traditional influence of the confrontational period of Soviet activity within the
UN, but instead will be built upon the domestic realities of Russian "power
politics." As one prominent Russian political scientist notes,
Yeltsin faces a new fight against emboldened conservatives. ...[Russian]
foreign policy has become hostage to the domestic policy struggle.... This is
not a surrender to the restorationists, most likely, but a temporary retreat
and tactical maneuver.211
In the end, while current Russian declaratory policy and activity within the
UN suggests a deep commitment to cooperation with the other "great powers" the
reality of domestic instability within the Russian Federation may force a more
conservative approach to cooperation in international organizations. This policy
211For an outstanding discussion of this foreign policy struggle see; German
Diligenskii, "Russia Lives Cheerfully From Session to Session," Litemturnaya
Gazeta, no. 39 23 September 1992, 1-2 (FBIS-USR-92-128, 7 October 1992, 59-60).
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will not mark a return toward the confrontation of old, but it will certainly foster
a more independent policy from the West.212
Domestic political infighting within the Russian Federation is not the only
factor which can be expected to limit the UN's ability to expand its role in the
"post-confrontational era." There are numerous bureaucratic obstacles which the
UN must overcome if it hopes to be an effective conflict management tool in the
international arena. These obstacles include the ongoing debate over Security
Council membership, Security Council voting procedures, bureaucratic
inefficiencies and probably most importantly, the ever increasing debt crisis that
now faces the UN. Suffice it to say that these obstacles, for the most part, lie
outside the scope of this thesis, however, they may prove to be the most serious
barriers toward the expansion of any UN activities. Vladimir Petrovsky best
summed up the ability of the UN to function in the future when he stated that
There is a danger that the United Nations may become a hostage to its own
popularity: The organization may not have enough money for all the
ambitious programs which it is undertaking.213
212Many authors have pointed to certain actions within the Russian Federation
which would point to a more centrist policy. The resignation or replacement of
Andrei Kozyrev and his closest advisors would certainly be one such indication.
For an outstanding discussion of this possibility and its effect on Russian foreign
policy see, Jeff Checkel, "Russian Foreign Policy: Back to the Future?," RFE/RL
Research Report 1, no. 41, (16 October 1992), 15-29.
213Yurii Leonov, "Nobody Doubts Russia's Greatness—So Says UN Deputy
Secretary General for Political Questions Vladimir Petrovsky," Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
2 September 1992, 1 (FBIS-SOV-92-172, 3 September 1992, 15). For a brief review
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Although this study did not focus on United States policy in the United
Nations it seems three generalities can be drawn from Russian activity in the UN
with regard to U.S. national interests. First, if Russia is indeed successful in
establishing the UN as the "main security organization in the world" the U.S. will
be forced to come to grips with the question of how much national sovereignty
it would be willingly to surrender to the Security Council. Similarly, the U.S.
executive branch might finds itself with a problem now facing the Russian
executive, namely a legislative body that is seeking to extend its influence in UN
matters beyond the scope of budgetary limitation. Secondly, if Russia continues
to press this cooperative path within the UN, the United States government might
find itself having to increasingly support popular international measures
mandated by the UN or suffer the consequences of international disdain that
would accompany any U.S. veto within the Security Council. In other words, the
U.S. might also become a "hostage" to the international popularity of the UN.
Finally, the U.S. will have to decided how to react to a future Russian veto in the
Security Council. The reemergence of such an occurrence will surely transpire
and might not be dictated by a return to the confrontation of the cold war but
instead might merely be a means of voicing an emerging Russian national
of the debt problem now facing the UN see; Paul Lewis, "With U.S. the Biggest
Debtor, President Finds U.N. Skeptical," New York Times, 22 September 1992, A7;
and A. Shalnew, "For UN Membership Status One May Not Only Incur Expenses,
but Earn Money," Izvestiya, 23 July 1992, 5 (FBIS-USR-92-099, 5 August 1992, 79-
81).
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interest. At the very least it could be a tactic used by the Russian President to
win support of those centrist to conservative elements in his government. Surely,
one veto (on a less than significant policy position) should not be reason to fear
the return of the confrontational period in the UN. However, it may very well
signal that the Russian government is moving toward a more conservative
approach to international relations based on the protection of national
sovereignty. On the other hand, a veto that is registered by the Russian
government in the face of significant U.S. lobbying pressure or the return of
multiple Russian veto's in the Security Council would surely mark the return of
the confrontational period.
In the end, while cooperation in the UN brings with it many opportunities
it also brings with it some problems, the most significant of which is the
relegation of national sovereignty. While many experts have maintained that with
the end of the cold war the UN might finally now be able to fulfill its envisioned
mission, the world must realize that the age old notions of sovereignty and
domestic jurisdiction still exist. Nations must, if they hope to expand the role of
the UN, seek a new balance between sovereignty and intervention. Furthermore,
these nations will have to overcome the many bureaucratic obstacles which
threaten to impede any future expansion of the UN's function as the "maintainor
of international peace and security." While Russian activity in the UN may go a
long way toward removing the confrontation of the past, there are many other
hurdles which will have to be crossed.
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In conclusion, a continued policy of cooperation in the UN would net the
Russian Federation gains in international influence, enhanced security and most
importantly aid. However, the same problems that turned the former Soviet
Union toward the UN, namely; political, military and economic instability, may
eventually lead the Russia Federation away from the UN.
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